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Abstract
The Epistemological Realist (ER.)project, recently initiated by John McDowell in
Mind and World and Hilary Putnam in his 1994 series of Dewey Lectures, is an
extremely promising one. This project aims to show how a 'commonsense realism'
about the world and our relationship to it can be made tenable in a philosophical
climate increasingly dominated by various forms of anti-realism. At least part of the
reason for the prevalence of anti-realism is the unsatisfactory way in which realism
has traditionally been developed. Epistemological Realism departs from Traditional
Realism in at least three key areas: (a) its account of how perception enables
empirical knowledge, (b) its account of perception itself and (c) its account of how
our empirical knowledge claims bear on reality. The ability of the ER theorist to give
perfectly satisfactory accounts of (a)-(c) does much to reinstate 'commonsense
realism' as a philosophically respectable posi.tion.
Epistemological Realism 'commonsense realism' Traditional Realism anti-
realism perception empirical knowledge reality John McDowell Mind anq
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INTRODUCTION
My concern in this Research Report is to develop and defend the kind of realist
project recently initiated by John McDowell in Mind and World and Hilary Putnam
in his 1994 Dewey Lectures. This project - which I will term Epistemological
Realism (ER) - aims to show how a 'commonsense re., 'sm' about the world and our
relationship to it can be made tenable.
[A] 'COMMONSENSE REALISM'
The 'commonsense realism' which the Epistemological Realist is concerned to defend
involves a commitment to three general claims:
- we can (and do) have knowledge of the worid,
- the world exists independently of our minds, and
- WI! have access to the world in perception.
Importantly, these claims are to be taken together rather than separately. On the
realist view under consideration it is held that in perception we have access to the
mind-independent world, this access being a crucial ground of the possibility of
empirical knowledge. To put it in a slightly different way: the world of which we
have knowledge in virtue of our perceptual access to it is mind-independent. Or
again: our knowledge claims bear on the mind-independent world, this possibility
being secured by the perceptual access we have to the latter.
There are two important qualifications which must be made concerning the above
however. In defending 'commonsense realism' the Epistemological Realist is not
claiming either that we do (or can) have knowledge of ALL aspects of the world, or
that all aspects of the world are MIND-INDEPENDENT. With regard to the former,
in holding that we can have knowledge of the world the ER theorist is primarily
concerned with the ordinary everyday aspects of the world to which our senses give
us access. With regard to the latter, in holding that the world is mind-independent the
2ER theorist is happy to accept that this does not apply to the world in its entirety - the
ER theorist does not mean to suggest that social constructs, or indeed such mental
items as beliefs and desires, are not part of the furniture of the world.
It is worth takinp note of the fact that the ER characterization of realism commits the
'errors' warned against by Michael Devitt off ailing to distinguish the metaphysical
(ontological) issue of realism from any semantic or epistemological issue, and of
failing to settle the former before the latter (Devitt, 1991). On Devitt's view the
realism/anti-realism distinction must be held to tuIL1 on the ontological nature of the
world alone, and this issue must be decided before the issue of whether or not we can
have knowledge of this world. Although a detailed discussion and criticism of
Devitt's views here are beyond the scope of the Research Report, I do want to say
something in support of how the Epistemological Realist characterizes realism. It
seems to me that if the real world is not the one on which our most basic knowledge
claims bear then the issue of its existence or non-existence ceases to be particularly
interesting. There is something strange about referring to someone who claims tbat
the world of which we have knowledge is not mind-independent, but who
nevertheless retains a commitment to some noumenal realm ~'things in themselves',
as a REALIST. What it is important to note here is that the way the realism/anti-
realism distinction is being drawn in this Research Report, an account is anti-realist if
it challenges the 'commonsense realist' picture outlined above.
What the Epistemological Realist is concerned to show, then, is that we can make
good on our 'commonsense realist' intuition that we can and (In have knowledge of
the mind-independent world. Importantly, however, ER acknowledges that there is
much work to be done in this regard. In particular the I:R theorist argues that the way
'commonsense realism' has traditionally been developed must be abandoned.
3[B] T ..ADITIONAL REALISM
As both McDowell and Putnam note, the philosophical climate of the last century has
become increasingly dominated by various forms of anti-realism. On the ER view, at
least partly responsible for this rise in the popularity of anti-realism has heen the
failure of Traditional Realism (TR) to cash out the details of the 'commonsense
realist' intuition in the right ways.
The ER theorist urges that there are at least three areas in which we must take issue
with the Traditional Realist if a 'commonsense realism' about the world is to be
secured:
(a) the TR account of how perception is able to make knowledge of the world
possible,
(b) the TR account of perception itself, and
(c) the TR account of how our knowledge claims bear on reality.
The ER project is centrally concerned to show that once we take issue with (a)-(c)
and replace them with the right kinds of accounts then there is nothing to prevent us
from being 'commonsense realists'.
[C] REPORT OUTLINE
In Chapter One of this Research Report I will be concerned with the failure ofTR to
provide a satisfactory account of how perception enables empirical knowledge [(a)
above]. I will follow Wilfred Sellars and McDowell in arguing that the TR
characterization of perceptual content as 'raw data' prevents such content from being
able to stand in the right kind of relation to our empirical knowledge claims. I will
however take issue with Sellars' and McDowell's positive accounts, and argue that
the ER project is made more secure by adopting the account advanced by Michael
Pendlebury,
4In Chapter Two I will turn my attention to the problems confronting the TR account
of perception itself [(b) above]. I will follow both Putnam and McDowell in arguing
that a 'commonsense realism' will remain untenable unless the TR idea that
perception must form an INTERFACE between the perceiver and the world is
abandoned. The main body of the chapter willLe devoted to showing how a 'Direct
Theory of Perception' can be unproblematically developed and advanced.
In the final chapter of this Research Report I will tum to consider the TR account of
how our knowledge claims bear on reality. I will argue along with Putnam that the
TR conception of language as a 'mirror image' of reality must be abandoned. I will be
centrally concerned to argue that 'commonsense realism' is compatible with as
sophisticated an understanding of the language-world relation as we could reasonably
require.
[D] THE ER PROJECT
There is a final but important point that must be made. Itmight be objected in light of
what follows that there is nothing particularly new about what the ER theorist
proposes in a lot of instances. Indeed, it will becorn ~evident that very often the ER
theorist explicitly appeals to the works of realist philosophers pre-dating the project
by years. In what sense then is the Traditional Realist anything more than an ER
construction? And isn't talk of 'the ER project' somewhat contrived?
The important point to see here is that the Epistemological Realist sees herself as
situated within, and confronted by, a very different problematic to the realist of the
past. The philosophical arena has become so dominated by various forms of anti-
realism that a commitment to 'commonsense realism' is considered hopelessly naive
in many quarters. Part of the reason for this is a widespread misconception of what
realism must involve - many tum to anti-realism because they see the picture I am
5caning 'Traditional Realism' as the only alternative. The ER project is one of
correcting this misconception.
In a sense then 'Traditional Realism' IS something of an ER construction - it is the
device the ER theorist employs in order to engage directly with the anti-realist.
(Although of course TR is no MERE construction - the TR picture is one we are all
well acquainted with.) What sets the ER project apart is its recognition of the NEED
to engage with the anti-realist if 'commonsense realism' is to again become a
philosophically resj.ectable position.
6CHAPTER ONE: THE MYTH OF THE GIVEN
The question of whether or not ER can provide us with a satisfactory account of how
perception makes empirical knowledge possible is crucial to the success of the ER
project. It has lung been accepted that if the idea of empirical knowledge is to be so
much as intelligible then perception will need to be appealed to as a ground of its
very possibility. The difficulty comes in providing the right account of the
relationship between the deliverances of perceptual experience and our empirical
knowledge claims. Inthe absence of such an account, however, the idea that we do
have knowled.ge of a mind-independent world is seriously tnreatened.
In this chapter I will be centrally concerned with the objections against the TR
account of how perception enables empirical knowledge raised by Wilfred Sellars in
his paper 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind' (Sellars, 1971a). It is Sellars'
claim that the TR account involves a commitment to 'the myth of the Given'. While I
will follow Sellars in arguing that the TR conception of perceptual content as raw
data wil.l not do, I will take issue with his assumption that it must be linguistically
structured. Aside from the fact that Sellars' conception of perceptual content leads
him to anti-realism, it will be my claim that there are good independent reasons for
thinking that Sellars must be wrong. I will then tum to consider an argument put
forward by John McDowell in l\Iind and World (McDowell, 1994) on the basis of
which he concludes with Sellars that perceptual content must be conceptual.
McDowell's claim however is that such a conception of perceptual content is
necessary if 'commonsense realism' is to be secured. This will lead us to something of
a dilemma, the solution to which, I will suggest, is to adopt the kind of account
proposed by Pendlebury (see e.g., Pendlebury, 1997, 1998a).
7[A] PERCEPTION AND KNOWLEDGE
Before turning to evaluate the TR account of the relation between perception and
empirical knowledge, it is necessary to say something about what is required of such
an account. Inparticular, we need to address the qrestion of WHY perception is held
to be an important ingredient of empirical knowledge. In Mind and World Mcfrowell
identifies two crucial roles which perception must piav if we are to make sense of the
possibility of having knowledge of the world.
The first is that our perceptual access to the world must serve to infuse our thought
with empirical content. If our thoughts are to be ABOUT the world, if our concepts
are to APPL Y to it, then empirical content must somehow 'get into' our conceptual
system. In the absence of experiential intake from tnt! world our 'thought' would
degenerate, inMcDowell's terms. into 'the play of empty forms' (1994, p6). So one
crucial role which perception must play is to inject our concepts with empirical
substance.
The second role for which perception seems the only candidate is that of allowing the
world to generate some kind of constraint on our thinking about it. While the first role
is one of enabling empirical THOUGHT, the second is the specifically
epistemological role of enabling empirical KNOWLEDGE. The idea here is that the
justification or grounding of our beliefs about the world must be a matter of the world
itself having provided some kind of resistance to their formation, If the world itself
exerts no constraint upon the formation of our beliefs about it in our attempt to arrive
at empirical knowledge, such that this constraint can serve as the ultimate source of
their warrant, then our exercises of conceptual capacities reduce to nothing more than
'moves in a self-contained game' (Mefrowell, 1994, p5), 'a frictionless spinning in a
void' (McDowell, 1 r- >4, p 11). And indeed, if our being justified in holding some
belief about the world is not a matter of the world's in some sense having constrained
8its formation, then on what ground can we help ourselves to the notion that the belief
is even ABOUT the world, never mind a potential candidate for knowledge?'
It is evident that in endorsing this second criterion I am following McDowell in ruling
out a coherentist conception of the justificatory structure. Coherentism is the view
that our beliefs are justified in virtue of their internal coherence with one another, and
not through having some ultimate grounding in perception. Although many
philosophers have argued that coherentism is perfectly compatible with realism
(Bonjour, 1985 and Lehrer, 1978 are two examples here), I think that McDowell is
exactly right to see that coherentism is not a very promising position for the ER
theorist to adopt. We need to be able to make sense of the idea that a belief's being
justified contributes strongly to the likelihood of the belief's being TRUE, and more
than that to its being a true l alief ABOUT the world. The point is that it does not
seem that coherence BY ITSELF can give 11S what we need here. (This is obviously
not to say that coherence does 110tplaya role in justification.)
The second role which perception must play then is that of grounding our empirical
knowledge claims through allowing the world to provide the required resistance to
their formation. As McDowell points out, these two roles are intimately related. For it
is BY in some sense fixing the content of our concepts in perception that the world is
able to constrain the grounds of their correct application.
[B] TRADITIONAL REALISM
We must now turn to consider the Traditional Realist account of the relation between
perceptual experience and empirical knowledge. The Traditional Realist holds that in
perceptual experience we have access to 'raw data' caused by the world, this access
either constituting or giving rise to a foundational form of knowledge. These
I As will become evident later, I am not entirely in agreement with McDowell on what the nature of
this 'resistance' must be. For this reason, r leave it unspecitled hen lust what 'justification', 'warrant'
9foundational beliefs are held to be self-justified in virtue of being absolutely certain:
they are incorrigible, indubitable and infallible. Given the claim for the status of
'absolute certainty' of these beiiefs, they are held to presuppose no further knowledge
at all: the apprehension of sense data is not held to entail the application of concepts,
or any theoretical, ordering or inferential operations.' Our higher level empirical
beliefs are held to be justified in virtue of the logical relations of support (such as
implication and probalification) holding between these foundational beliefs and
themselves, such relations also serving to transmit empirical substance from the
foundational beliefs upwards.
The Traditional Realist account then both recognizes, and attempts to accommodate,
the two roles that perception must play in relation to empirical knowledge if the latter
is to be shown to be possible. The question that we need to address is whether or not
the attempt is successful. It seems to me that upon reflection we must concede that it
is not.
[2] SELLARS AND THE MYTH OF THE GIVEN
In his 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind' Sellars argues that the TR account of
the relationship between perception and empirical knowledge will not do on the
ground that it entails a commitment to 'the myth of the Given'. The myth is to suppose
that access to 'raw data' can provide us with infallible epistemic foundations - or
indeed with any epistemic foundations at all. On Sellars' view, the TR conception of
perceptual content as raw sense data prevents perception from playmg either of the
roles necessary for the possibility of empirical knowledge.
and the like must amount to.
2 It is evident that if the application of concepts andlor such theoretical, ordering and inferential
operations ARE required for the apprehension of such data, then the beliefs constituting such
apprehension cannot be absolutely certain. In applying concepts or carrying out such operations there
is always the possibility that one might go WRONG.
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In this section I will consider Sellars' arguments against the TR attempt to
accommodate each of these roles in turn. In each case I will agree with Sellars that
the TR account will not do, and for the more particular reasons he gives. I will
however take issue with his more positive account in each instance.
(i) Infusing thought with content
On the TR account then, it is our apprehension of 'raw data' in perception that is held
to explain how our thoughts acquire then empirical substance - how they can be said
to be ABOUT the world. It is Sellars' contention that a piece of 'raw data' as it is
characterized by the Sense Datum theorist is simply incapable of performing the task
required. In order to see what is at issue here, it is necessary to SD.y a little more about
the TR 'Sense Datum Theory'.
On Sellars' characterization (which I will adopt), Sense Datum theories offer an act-
object account of the episodes of sensory awareness that constitute the non-inferential
knowings of the TRjustificatory structure. The theory distinguishes between some
act of awareness - a sensing - and some singular piece of raw experiential intake - a
'sense datum' - which is the object of the act. Foundational beliefs ionsist in the
sensings of 'sense data' ,3 The Sense Datum theorist thus equates 'X senses red sense
datum S' with 'X non-inferentially knows that S is red'.
There is something that seems to jar on this account however. It is not clear that X's
sensing of a red sense datum (S) CAN be equated with X's knowing THAT S is red.
According to the TR theorist, our foundational beliefs are absolutely certain - it is
impossible for them to be false. Now there does seem to be a sense in which X's
apprehension of a red sense datum is not something that X can be wrong about. The
problem is that the same does not seem to hold for X's believing of the sense datum
11
THAT it is red.
Sellars provides an excellent analysis of what is going on here. On Sellars' view, the
concept ofasense datum is the result of the conflation of two ideas:
1. The idea that there are certain inner episodes which can occur to human
beings, infants and even animals, and which are necessary IN SOME SENSE for us
to be able to recognize that some physical object is red; and
2. The idea that there are certain inner episodes that constitute the non-
inferential knowings that, for example, certain physical objects are red; and that these
episodes are necessary for our having any kind of empirical knowledge at all.
Sellars maintains that the first of these two ideas takes its impetus from the attempt to
explain the facts of sense perception scientifically. In particular, it is the attempt a
explain the fact that people can have the experience of 'seeing' a red triangle both
when a red triangular object is present and when it is not. What explains this fact is
that in both kinds of experience - veridical and non-veridical - people have a
'sensation' of a 'red triangle'. What is crucial to note with regard to this idea 1sthat
'having the sensation of a red triangle' is not specified by the explanation to have any
epistemic import - it is not even specified by the explanation to be something of
which we are aware,"
Now it is Sellars' contention that this idea is typically distorted by the Sense Datum
Theorist to fit the requirements of another, radically confused line of thought. This
line of thought runs along the following lines: The seeing that some object is red and
triangular is a veridical member of a group of experiences, some of which are non-
veridical. Call this group of experiences 'ostensible seeings'. Now it is a feature of
~ I will for the sake of simplicity ignore those accounts on which it is held that foundational beliefs are
inferred FROM, and do not consist IN, the sensing of sense data. As wiII become apparent, nothing
turns on my doing so.
4 It is worth pointing out that Sellars in fact endorses something very like this idea. And indeed, I will
argue in Chapter Two that the way out of ' the problem of illusion' for the ER theorist is to follow
Sellars in this regard.
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ostensible seeings that there is (in principle) no way to discern the veridical from the
non-veridical. However, to suppose that the non-inferential knowledge upon which
our entire world picture rests consists of those ostensible seeings as just happen to be
\I, ridicel i to make empirical knowledge too risky an affair, a simple matter of
chance. Consequently, the foundation of empirical knowledge cannot consist of such
items as 'seeing that some object is red and triangular'.
According to Sellars (and I think he is exactly right here), few would accept this
conclusion based on the reasoning above. Rather we are inclined to say, correctly,
that since the foundation of empirical knowledge is in fact the non-inferential
knowledge of such ostensible seeings (and hearings, touchings etc.,) as are veridical,
it does consist of members ofa group containing non-veridical members. Before this
move is made, however, the above line of thought become" entangled with the first.
As Sellars writes, 'The idea springs to mind that SENSA 1 iONS OF RED
TRIANGLES have exactly the virtues which OSTENSIBLE SEEINGS OF RED
TRIANGLES LACK' (1971a, p13S). The primary virtue here is clearly the fact that it
makes no sense to speak of unveridical sensations.
The point which is overlooked by the Sense Datum Theorist in her combination of
these two ideas, argues Sellars, is that the sense in which it is unintelligible to say of a
sensation that it is non-veridical is precisely the sense in which it is unintelligible to
say of a sensation that it is VERIDICAL. Sensations are simply not the kinds of
things that can be ..ght or wrong. The reason for this is that they are not ABOUT
anything - they do not represent anything AS BEING THE CASE.s
In equating 'X senses red sense datum S' with 'X non-inferentially knows that S is red'
the Sense Datum Theorist is trying to have the best of both worlds. The apprehension
of a piece of raw data is only something we cannot be wrong about if such data is not
5 It is for the same reason that it cannot be held that we INFER foundational beliefs from the sensing of
sense data. I will discuss this point in more detail shortly.
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taken to have representational content. It is only if in the apprehension of some sense
datum we are not apprehending THAT SUCH-AND-SUCH is the case that we cannot
be mistaken. If sense data are N01 representational however, the apprehension of
such data cannot be equated with non-inferentially knowing THAT-SUCH-AND-
SUCH is the case. Indeed, if the apprehension of such data amounts to nothing more
than the having of brute sensations then the term 'data' here is highly misleading - if
sense data are not representational then they are incapable of providing us with
information about anything at all.
The TR theorist is led to characterize the 'content' of perceptual experiences as brute
sensations in an attempt to meet the misguided requirement that our foundational
beliefs be absolutely certain." What she fails to appreciate in doing so is that the
content of perceptual experience ceases to be representational. And this clearly
compromises the ability of perceptual experience to perform the role of infusing our
thought with empirical content.
The point to see is that we need perception to explain how our concepts can be about
- can apply to - the world, If' perceptual intake itself is not representational - if it is not
ABOUT anything at all - then it is difficult to see how it could perform the role
required. If the contents of our perceptual experiences are not ABOUT the world then
how on earth can they secure that our THOUGHTS are? It seems to me that if the ER
project is to go through then it will have to characterize perceptual content as being
representational- as being of the form THAT SUCH-AND-AND-SUCH IS THE
CASE.
In holding that perceptual content is representational - that it represents a state of
affairs as obtaining - WI! are committed to what Pendlebury terms the 'propositional
account' of perceptual experience (Pendlebury, 1989). Perceptual content is
b The requirement is a result of the TR attempt to answer the Cartesian skeptic. It is commonly
accepted now that absolute certainty is not required for knowledge however,
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propositional in that it can be true or false, stand in logical relatione to other
propositional items, have informational content and be in principle accepted or
rejected (Pendlebury, 1989, p219; 1997, p7). Although a detailed defense of this
account ofthe nature of perceptual experience is beyond the scope of this Research
Report, it is worth pointing out that there are many considerations apart from the one
with which we are concerned which mitigate in its favor,"
While Iagree with Sellars that against TR the content of perceptual experience must
be representational, it is necessary to say something more about Sellars' views in this
regard. For Sellars' central contention is that only linguistically (or, more generally,
conceptually) structured items can be: or the form THAT SUCH-AND-SUCH IS THE
CASE. Inparticular, it is Sellars' claim that only what is conceptual can represent
anything at all.
It is important to note that the ER theorist cannot simply go along with Sellars here,
since it is this commitment which leads Sellars to embrace a strong anti-realism with
regard to the world upon which our knowledge claims bear. If all representation must
be linguistic, then it follows that something like the view that Sellars terms
Psychological Nominalism must hold. Psychological Nominalism is the view that:
...all awareness of sorts, resemblances, facts etc., in short all awareness of
abstract entities - indeed, all awareness even of particulars - is a linguistic
affair ...not even the awareness of such sorts, resemblances and facts as
pertain to so-called immediate experience is presupposed by the process of
acquiring a language.
(l971a, p160)
7 One such consideration is Pendlebury's point that we cannot explain animal behavior in terms of
perception unless we hold that the animals perceptual experience is propositional. Pendlebury writes,
We cannot, e.g., explain why an impala rushed offin a certain direction by appealing to the
hypothesis that it smelled a lion, unless we take it for granted that its sense of smell provided
it with information (or possibly misinformation) about the location of the lion which makes
sense of the impala's rushing off in THAT direction. Such perceptual information is clearly
propositional.
(1997, pI9)
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It is Sellars' contention that the significance of Psychological Nominalism to the
doctrine of the Given becomes apparent when it is contrasted with a naive but
widespread conceptior .' what language learning consists in. On this view, learning a
first language consists to a greater or lesser degree in learning the names of certain
items to which one has some kind of pre-linguistic access. As Sellars writes,
...we conceive of (the first language learner) ...in a world of physical objects,
coloured, producing sounds, existing in Space and Time. But though it is we
who are familiar with this logical space, we run the danger, if we are not
careful, of picturing the language learner as having ab initio some degree of
awareness - 'pre-analytic', limited and fragmentary though it may be - of this
same logical space ...we can easily take for granted that the process of
teaching a child to Use a language is that of teaching it to discriminate
elements within a logical space of particulars, universals, facts, etc., of which
it is already undiscrin+satingly aware, and to associate these discriminated
elements with these ools.
(1971a, pp161-162)
As against Psychological Nominalism, we can refer to this view, following the later
Wittgenstein, as the Augustinian conception of the learning and use of language. 8
What we need to see a.ccording to Sellars, is that we have no such conception of the
world prior to our learning to use a language. What Psychological Nominalism
asserts is that there can be no 'awareness oflogical space prior to, 0'" independent of.
the acquisition of a language' (1971 a, p 162). Now if Psychological Nominalism holds
then it is evident that the positing of the Given as an epistemological category is
radically confused. For proponents of the Given make the mistake of holding that
some item which requires no prior knowledge, concept formation or theoretical
ordering for its apprehension can nevertheless put us in contact with the logical space
upon which our knowledge claims bear. And this cannot be possible, since our
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awareness of this Iogicai space presupposes and is dependent upon the acquired
ability of concept formation and application that is language.
It is important to note that Psychological Nominalism does not in and of itself entail
that what Sellars refers to as 'logical space' is not the real world. What it does entail is
that even the representational content of perceptual experience cannot be unstructured
by language," It is easy to see how this kind of consideration might push in the
direction of anti-realism, however. If awareness of the world upon which our
knowledge claims bear is only possible through language, then it is only a short step
to supposing that this world is itself largely a product oflanguage. And indeed, this is
a step that Sellars takes.
There are two important qualifications that must be made regarding Sellars' account.
The first is that while Sellars is not 2. 'commonsense realist', he is not a
straightforward anti-realist either, given the way the realism/anti-realism distinction is
being drawn in this Research Report. While it is the case that that on Sellars' view the
world on which our everyday knowledge claims bear is in some very strong sense
mind-dependent, Sellars does believe that there is an independently existing real
world of which we can have knowledge. This real world is the world as understood
by physics. and the knowledge in question is purely scientific.1o
The second qualification is that Sellars is not denying that anything is 'given' at all, in
any possible sense of 'given'. That is to say, he is not proposing that prior to learning
a first language we all have radically different modes of experiencing. In this sense
Sellars is happy to allow that there is a 'given'. But the point to note is that this 'given'
has no bearing on the world of which we have knowledge. This non-cognitive 'given'
8 See Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (1995) in this regard.
9 As we shall see, McDowell argues that while perceptual experience is conceptual, the concepts
involved serve to 'open us up' to the mind-independent world. As I shall argue in Chapter Two
however, it is not evident that McDowell's account is not itself in danger of collapsing into some or
other form of idealism.
10 This side of Sellars' account will be considered in some detail in Chapter Two.
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is itself an experience, not an experiencing of SOME THING. Intentionality or
representation requires the application of concepts and is at bottom linguistic.
What then should the ER theorist say in response to Sellars' more positive account?
For it seems that as long as it is allowed that something like Psychological
Nominalism holds, the threat of anti-realism will remain real. The point to see
however is that Psychological Nominalism is not a very happy position - it seems to
make more mysteries than it solves. Most importantly, it makes a mystery of how we
could ever come to acquire a language at all.
The point to see here is that if the pre-linguistic child does not have ANY kind of
access to the world upon which language bears - if her perceptual experience is
nothing but a series of brute sensations which are not ABOUT anything - then how
could she ever COME to have access to such a world? To answer that it is through
learning to use a language is entirely unsatisfactory, for this is the very point at issue.
How could a creature without any access to the world upon which language bears
come to learn to speak about it?
The point to see here is that the old Augustinian conception oflanguage learning,
bowever unsophisticated and unsatisfactory it might be, is not without insight. It does
seem to be the case that unless it is allowed that the pre-linguistic child has some kind
of access to the world upon which language bears, we cannot even begin to explain
the acquisition oflanguage. To be sure, Sellars is correct to challenge the view as it
stands: to maintain that the world of our experience upon the acquisition of a
language is not very different from that prior to such acquisition is unacceptably
-aive. But accepting this point does not mean that we have to deny the child any kind
of access to the world at all. On the contrary, the child must be held to have access
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enough that the crucial word-world connections can be set up upon which further
development can proceed. I I
It seems to me that it is only if we preserve this Augustinian insight that we can begin
to tell an intelligible story about language learning. Given that Sellars provides no
argument against even the full-blown Augustinian conception, and given that he
provides no argument for his proposed Psychological Nominalism, it seems to me
that in light of the fact that Sellars' account cannot explain language learning, we are
entitled to help ourselves to this insight.
Thus I would conclude that while Sellars is correct that on the TR characterization of
perceptual content as 'raw data' it cannot be said to represent the world (or anything at
all), I would disagree with Sellars that intentionality requires language. At least in the
case of the pre-linguistic child, it must be conceded that the content of perceptual
experience is representational without being conceptually structured. Of course, the
question of whether or not the ER theorist SHOULD hold that in the case of the
linguistically competent adult perceptual experience is conceptual is one that remains
to be addressed. Indeed, this question is one around which much of the subsequent
discussion in this chapter will be centered.
(ii) Justification
It is evident that on Sellars' view the TR account must fail with regard to the second
consideration as well.12 To recall, the second role which perception must play is to
II It is important to note that this does not commit us to some or other version (H the Referential
Theory of Meaning, however. We need not, and indeed should not, hold that to have established these
word-world connections is to have acquired the concepts expressed by such words. We can agree with
Sellars and the later Wittgenstein that the meaning of a word is gi yen not only by its worldly referent
but also (and more informatively) by the word's role or use in the language system to which it belongs.
What the acquisition of such word-world connections does secure is the possibility of our coming to
acquire those concepts. I will return to this consideration in Chapter Three.
I~Both McDowell (1994) and Pendlebury (1997) have read Sellars as (somewhat indirectly) objecting
to the TR account on this score.
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constrain the formation of our empirical beliefs such that uiose beliefs can count as
justified. On the TR account this constraint takes the form of logical relations of
support holding between the 'raw data' to which we have access in sense experience
and our higher level empirical beliefs. For the same reason that the TR theorist is
mistaken in EQUATING 'X senses red sense datum S' and 'X non-inferentially knows
THAT S is red', so she is mistaken in holding that the apprehension of red sense
datum S could logically SUPPORT tile belief THAT ~ is red.
The point to see is that on the TR conception of a piece of 'raw data' as a brute
sensation, it is not the kind of thing capable of standing in logical relations. Relations
like implication and probalification can only hold between propositional items - items
of the form THAT SUCH-AND-SUCH is the case. A 'sense datum', being non-
representational, is not the kind of thing capable of standing in such a relation.
Let us take stock of what has been said so far. In light of Sellars' critique of the
doctrine of the Given it has emerged that the Traditional Realist's characterization of
I am in firm agreement with Sellars in this regard. If the justification of our empirical
beliefs is a matter of their being implied.' . perceptual experiences, then the content
of perceptual experience cannot be characterized as a brute sensation - it must at
minimum be propositional.
It is important to note that this is only one of the grounds upon which Sellars finds the
TR account of how perception forms the ultimr-e source of justification
unsatisfactory. Another problem Sellars has with the account stems from his anti-
realism. 'il. piece of 'raw data', being entirely non-linguistically structured, can have no
bearing at all on the world to which our knowledge claims are answerable- this world
is in some very real sense a product of language. As I have argued however. there is
no good reason to follow Sellars into anti-realism.i''
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perceptual intake as 'raw data' or brute sensations prevents her from being able to give
a satisfactory account of how empirical knowledge is possible. For in the first place,
'raw data' is not representational, and so our apprehension of it cannot explain how
thought can be ABOUT the world. And in the second place, if the justification of our
empirical beliefs is a matter of their being supported by what we apprehend in
sensory experience, then what we apprehend in sense experience cannot be 'raw datal.
Again it seems that the content of perceptual experience must be representational ifit
is to perform the role required.
Is this the end of the matter then? Can we secure the aim of the ER project with
regard to the possibility of empirical knowledge by simply adopting an account of
perceptual content on which it is held to be representational? Of course, this will
mean that we will have to give up the TR requirement that our foundational beliefs be
absolutely certain, but that requirement was always flawed. Unfortunately, we cannot
just leave the matter here. The reason for this is that there is another objection to the
TR account that must be considered - that advanced by John lv1cDoweli in Mind and
World. It is McDowell's contention that if perceptual content is to serve as the
ultimate ground of the justification of our empirical beliefs, it cannot be merely
propositional - it must be conceptual as well.
[D] JOl-IN MCDOWELL
In Mind and World John McDowell is concerned to advance an account of the
relation between perception and empirical knowledge such that a 'commonsense
realism' about the world and our relation to it can be secured. It is McDowell's central
claim that if such a 'commonsense realism' is to emerge as so much as a viable option
for us, then itmust be accepted that the content of our perceptual experience is
conceptually structured.
D On the basis of his Psychological Nominalism at any rate.
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In this section I will first outline Mcflowell's argument against the TR conception of
perceptual content, which he sees as a development of Sellars' attack on the doctrine
of the Given. I will then turn to consider McDowell's positive account. in which he
holds that, contra Sellars, the concept-laden nature of perc eptua I experience serves to
put us in contact with the independent world, rather than threatening its existence.
(i) lustification-as-reason-giving
It is McDowell's contention that if our empirical beliefs are to be justified by
perceptual experience then it is not enough that we characterize perceptual content as
propositional. The reason for this, argues McDowell, is that the fact that our empirical
beliefs are objectively supported by the deliverances of experience does not mean that
they are thereby justified. We are justified in holding some belief on Mclrowell's
view only if we are able to give a REASON for holding it. It follows from this that if
perceptual content is what justifies our higher level empirical beliefs, then perceptual
content must be the kind of thing which could be somebody's reason. And the crucial
point to see, argues McDowell, is that only what has conceptual content could
function as a reason.
In advancing this account of what justification must amount to McDowell follows
Sellars himself. In 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind' Sellars writes,
...in characterizing an episode or state as that of knowing, we are not giving an
empirical description of that state; wr are placing it in the logical space of
reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says.
(1971a, p169)
The real problem with the TR account according to McDowell is that it attempts to
make out 'that the space of reasons, the space OJ justifications or warrants, extends
more widely than the conceptual sphere' (1994, p7).
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To see what McDowell is saying here, we need to look more closely at the social
practice of giving and asking for reasons, at that tract of human life which Sellars
calls 'the space of reasons'. Having a reason in the sense meant here implies a number
of things: the awareness of the reason as a reason (knowing that and how A supports
B); being able to articulate the reason upon request; being able to reflect upon the
extent to which the reason supports the belief in question; being able to reject or
modify the belief in light of new evidence which weakens the reason's relation of
support, etc. Perhaps most importantly, we are held responsible for our reasons in the
sense that there is a standard of rationality with which reason holders are expected to
comply.
Given the above considerations it is McDowell's contention that reasons must be
conceptual. For it seems impossible to imagine hov something which was not subject
to a high degree of conceptual sophistication could possibly function as a reason in
the sense outlined above. And the problem of course is that the Traditional Realist
has characterized the 'raw data' which we receive from the world as radically non-
conceptual.
If McDowell is right about what justification must amount to, then it is evident that
the ER project can only go through if it can be made intelligible that perceptual
content is conceptually structured. It is with this task that Mclrowell is centrally
concerned.
(ii) McDowell's 'Natural Realism'
McDowell devotes the main body of Mind and World to the defense of the position
he terms 'Natural Realism'. Natural Realism aims to show that while our perceptual
experience is conceptually structured, it is nevertheless capable of affording us access
to the mind-independent world. I will tum to the question of whether or not Natural
Realism is successful in this regard in Chapter Two. For now I am simply concerned
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with whether Natural Realism can make it intelligible that the content 0f perceptual
experience is conceptual.
The idea that the deliverances of perception are conceptually structured is one that is
likely to meet with a lot of resistance. McDowell argues that part of the reason for
this is that the faculties of sensibility and the understanding have traditionally been
characterized as being in opposition to one another. Sensibility is receptive anti
passive, while the understanding is the faculty of spontaneity - active and free in the
sense that what we think, unlike what we experience, is in some sense 'up to us'. 14 It
is easy to conclude from this that in sense experience the understanding :J1aysno ro>.
Rather, we are inclined to think that inperceptual experience we simplv receive raw
data from the world ..At the level of judgement the understanding is helu co act upon
this data in some kind of ordering activity through the application of concepts.
McDowell urges that we need to resist this conclusion. For if we accept it, then we
are prevented from characterizing perceptual experience as conceptual, and so from
holding that perceptual experience can justify our empirical beliefs.
The alternative conception which McDowell proposes - Natural Realism - is that
while empirical knowledge results from the co-operation of sensibility and the
understanding, sensibility does not make 'an even notionally separable contribution to
the co-operation' (1994, p9). This means that we must characterize perceptual
experience very differently. In particular, there can be no non-conceptual content to
experiences - insofar as sensibility passively receives experiential intake from the
world, this experiential intake already has conceptual content. McDowell proposes
that We understand perceptual experiences as 'states or occurrences in which
capacities that belong to spontaneity are in play in actualization's of receptivity'
14 That what we think is 'up to us' does not of course mean that there are no normative constraints on
what we SHOULD think. The point is rather that these nonnative constraints are themselves evidence
of the freedom of the understanding. I will return to this point in more detail in Section [F] of this
chapter.
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(1994, p66). In perceptual experience, the sensible and the conceptual cannot be
prized apart.
It is McDowell's claim that Natural Realism provides us with exactly what we need.
In particular, Natural Realism, unlike Traditional Realism, enables the world to
impose the right kind of constraint on our thinking about it. That sensibility is passive
means that the constraint is there in full force. That experience is nevertheless
conceptual means that perceptual experiences are exactly the right kinds of things to
act as justifiers - they can be reasons.
Is embracing McDowell's Natural Realism the way forward for ER then? Although it
will become clear that I am not unsympathetic to the intuitions that lead McDowell to
characterize perceptual experience as conceptual, I do not think that Natural Realism
is the most promising route for the ER advocate to take. The reason for this is that
Natural Realism has a highly troubling implication. It is to an examination of this that
we must now tum.
[E] THE ThOUBLE WITH NATURAL REALISM
The worrying implication of McDowell's account is that it entails that, in McDowell's
own words, there are 'different stories to tell about perceptual goings on in creatures
with spontaneity and creatures without it' (1994, p63). In particular, Mclrowell
acknowledges that there can be absolutely no common element between human
perceptual experience and that of other animals if Natural Realism holds. The reason
for this is that human perceptual experience is so to speak conceptual 'through and
through', and animals are entirely non-conceptual beings. Indeed, we are not to speak
of animals as having perceptual experiences at all on McDowell's view, given his
characterization of the latter. This is not to say of course that McDowell denies that
animals are perceptually sensitive to features of their environments. The point is
rather that there is absolutely no area of commonality between animal and human
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perceptual sensitivity. It is uninformative on McDowell's view to say that both
animals and humans are perceptually sensitive, since perceptual sensitivity takes
radically different forms in either case.
As Hilary Putnam argues in his 1994 Dewey lectures however, it is impossible to
shake the feeling that the difference between animal and human perception is one of
degree rather than form. Putnam's point is made more acute by the consideration that
infants must be classed with animals with regard to perceptual sensitivity to their
environments. It just seems plainly implausible to suppose that upon the acquisition
of a language the very form of human perceptual experience changes - that there is
absolutely NO commonality between the perceptual experiences of the linguistically
competent adult and the pre-linguistic child. Indeed, it seems that explaining the
acquisition of a first language lS likely to be as problematic for McDowell as it was
seen to be for Sellars - we seem to make a mystery of how we could come to acquire
conceptual capacities at all if we hold that the perceptual goings on in pre-linguistic
children are completely different to those in linguistically competent adults. And
indeed. it is considerably more plausible, given evolutionary theory, to suppose that
perceptual sensitivity forms a continuum between lower grade sentient life forms and
higher ones, than to suppose that it manifests itself in a variety of different forms.
Again, it is important to stress the point made in Section [C](i) above. It is very likely
that there are certain aspects of human perceptual experience which ARE dependent
upon the acquisition of sophisticated cognitive skills like self-consciousness and the
capacity for critical reflection and rational appraisal. The point is simply that these
aspects are surely not exhaustive of human perception as McDowell claims that they
are. Indeed, when we reflect upon our own perception of the world in sense
experience this point becomes even more compelling. Much of the time we are not
even fully consciously aware of our perceptual experiences- think of here of the
perceptual experiences one has when driving a car or walking down the road and
being pre-occupied with something else entirely.
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Although I am aware that the considerations raised above do not tell conclusively
against Mclfowell's account, it seems to me that they pose enough of a potential
obstacle to the ER project to warrant taking seriously. Unless we can find a way to
avoid being committed to the idea that human perceptual experience is conceptually
saturated, then it seems that the ER project is far from secure. Given that it is
McDowell's conception of justification- as-rea son-giving that leads to this problematic
idea, it is necessary to examine this conception of justification in more detail.
[F] MUST JUSTIFICATION INVOLVE REASONS?
Why does McDowell think t.hat the constraint imposed by perception upon the
formation of our empirical beliefs must be in the form of reasons? In other words,
why does McDowell rule out the possibility of the constraint's taking the form of an
objective relation of support? After all, the conception of justification-as-reason-
giving is not the only one on the market, and adopting it has certainly not done much
to enhance the plausibility of McDowell's attempt to secure a 'commonsense realism'.
If I read McDowell correctly, he thinks that holding that we are rationally responsive
to the deliverances of sense experience is the only way to do justice to the idea that
the conceptual realm is a realm of freedom. It is McDowell's contention that the
formation of a world view is not just a brute causal process but a case of 'making up
one's mind as to how things are' (1988, p365). What constrains how we make up our
minds must be some standard of rationality to which we are sensitive, and in virtue of
which our empirical thought is held responsible to its subject matter on McDowell's
view, otherwise the very notion of 'making up our minds' is lost.
It is for this reason that McDowell holds that not even a conception of perceptual
content as (merely) propositional will do. For the only way in which such content
could constrain the formation of our empirical beliefs is causally, and not rationally.
27
And while this might imply that we are not to blame with regard to the nature of our
empirical beliefs, it cannot mean that we have discharged our rational responsibility
to do justice to what we think about. McDowell writes, The idea of the (non-
conceptual) Given offers us exculpations where we wanted justifications' (1994, p8).
It should be noted from the outset that I do not think that McDowell's intuitions here
can simply be dismissed.P For in the first place, the Sellarsian idea of the 'space of
reasons' with its accompanying ideas ofrational responsiveness and cognitive
responsibility clearly does have application to human life and social practice. And in
the second place, there is a clear sense in which we do seem to be rationally
responsive to the deliverances of sense experience. Not only do we often cite
perceptual experiences as REASONS, but also we are able to REJECT certain
experiences as unveridical.
This said however, it does not seem to me that the conception of justification- as-
reason-giving can be the whole story either. The reason for this is that not all of our
epistemic life takes place within the 'space of reasons'. We very often do attribute
both justified beliefs and knowledge to people who are not in a position to provide
reasons for thinking as they do. Indeed, we typically attribute knowledge to beings
who are prevented from even entering 'the space of reasons' - animals and small
children are the obvious examples here. It seems to me in light of the above that
McDowell needs to make room for what Max de Gaynesford calls a more 'modest
epistemology' in addition to that accompanying the 'space of reasons'r'" For surely
philosophy should take its cue in the analysis of concepts from how we actually use
them.
15 Although as Michael Pendlebury pointed out to me, McDowell often sounds as though he is an
incompatibilist about freedom, and I would not want to follow him in this.
16 See de Gaynesford's Critical Notice on Mind and World in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy
(1996) vol. 74.
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Embracing such a 'modest epistemology' will involve the acceptance of some
extemalist conception of justification - for a certain range of circumstances at any
rate, (As I have said, the conception of justification-as-reason-giving is not without its
place.) On such a conception, whether or not some belief is justified WILL be a
matter of how objectively likely it is to be true.
Indeed, it seems to me that there is one point at which the Epistemological Realist
MUST adopt an extemalist or reliabilist conception of justification - at the level of
the very having of perceptual experience itself. The point to see here is that we do not
CHOOSE the content of our perceptual experiences. As McDowell himself
acknowledges,
In experience one finds oneself saddled with content. One's conceptual
capacities have already been brought into play, in the contents being available
to one, before on has any choice in the matter.
(1994, pIO)
That experience represents the world as being one way and not another - indeed, that
experience represents the world at all - is not something over which we have any
rational control. On what ground then ARE we justified in forming a world view on
the basis of perceptual experience? It is evident that the only possible answer here is
an extemalist one: perceptual experience can serve as the ultimate ground of the
justification of our empirical beliefs because it is a generally reliable source of
information about the world. As we shall see in Chapter Two, it is precisely because
McDowell does not acknowledge any extemalist conception of justification that he is
prevented from giving an answer to this question at all.
Given that we have an extemalist conception of justification at our disposal then, it
seems that we can avoid a commitment to the problematic idea that perceptual
content is conceptually structured. For now we need not hold that perceptual
experience must be able to serve as a reason for our higher level empirical beliefs in
order to justify them. That the propositional content of our perceptual experiences
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stands in the right kind of object" Ie relation of support to our higher level beliefs may
well be enough.
Indeed, in light of'ih, ,oints made earlier Iwould argue that the objective relations of
support holding between our higher level beliefs themselves are enough to render
those beliefs justified in most circumstances (provided of course that these relations
of support reach right down to the level of perceptual experience itself). For as we
have seen, being justified in holding some belief is very often not dependent on being
able to give a reason for it. Importantly, this does not mean that the Sellarsian idea of
the 'space of reasons' must be dismissed - the objective relations of support holding
between our higher level empirical beliefs will admit of inference from one belief to
the next.
This seems to leave us confronting something of a dilemma however. For while there
is no problem concerning the admittance of our higher level beliefs into the 'space of
reasons' - such items ARE conceptually structured in the case of human beings - we
have also acknowledged that perceptual experiences can enter into this logical space.
How can it be the case both that perceptual experiences are non-conceptual, and that
we can be rationally responsive to them?
The crucial point to see here is that McDowell suffers from oversight. Simply
because it is granted that we are on occasion rationally responsive to the deliverances
of sense experience, it does not follow that this rational responsiveness must attach
directly to the deliverances of perceptual experience themselves. It could well be the
case that we are rationally responsive to perceptual intake only once it has been raised
to the level of the understanding. To see what is being suggested here, let us tum to
consider the account put forward by Michael Pendlebury.
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[G] THE WAY FORWARD FORER
On Pendlebury's view perceptual content is always merely propositional and should
normally be understood as a rudimentary form of belief - the kind of belief which
could be attributed to an animal as well as a human being. In the case of human
beings however such beliefs can be taken up into the ambit of the understanding.
Crucially, this does not entail that such beliefs are radically altered or even re-
structured. All that has happened to such a belief is that 'certain of its logical powers
have become available to consciousness' (1997, p22). A rudimentary perceptual
beliefs being raised to the level of the understanding is nothing more than 'a matter of
(its) being embedded in and appropriately engaged by the high level patterns of
consciousness and reasoning which are characteristic of judgement' (1998a, p5). Of
course, Once a perceptual belief becomes embedded in the understanding it ceases to
have merely propositional content, and so it acquires the richness and determinacy
that full-blown conceptual content brings. What is crucial on Pendlebury's view is
that the belief does not thereby acquire NEW or DIFFERENT content however.
Pendlebury writes rather of the content of the beliefs being 'refined' as a result of
being accessed by the understanding.
Now it seems to me that an account along the lines of Pend Iebury's is able to solve
the dilemma with which we were confronted above. On this account, it becomes
intelligible how it can be the case both that perceptual content is non-conceptual
AND thai it is able to enter into the space of reasons. The crucial point to note is that
the level. which we are rationally responsive to the deliverances of sense
experiences is not that of the mere having of the experiences themselves. Given that
perceptual experiences do not loose anything by way of content in being accessed by
the understanding however, what we are rationally respcnsive to IS in some very real
sense the way that perception represents the world as being.
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Indeed, it is evident that Pendlebury's aCCOIDltis very well suited to meeting the firs:
criterion of infusing our thought with empirical content as well. The conceptual
content of our empirical beliefs is about the world by virtue of being a refinement of
the content of our perceptual expeuences themselves.
I would thus conclude that ER can give the right kind of account of the relation
between perception and empirical knowledge such that the possibility of the latter is
secured. In doing so however, the ER theorist needs to depart from the Traditional
Realist in one important respect: the characterization of'perceptual content. For it is
only once perceptual content is viewed as propositional that perception is able to
perform either of the roles required of it. Getting the right account of perceptual
content is only half the story however. As we shall see in the next chapter, the TR
account of perception itself needs to be radically amended ifthe ER project is to go
through.
CHAPTER TWO: OPENNESS TO REALITY
In the last chapter I was concerned with the problems facing the TR account of the
CONTENT of perceptual experience, In this chapter I will call attention to the
equally problematic TR account of perceptual EXPERIENCE itself. For while the TR
conception of perceptual content threatens our 'commonsense realist' intuition that
we can (and do) have knowledge of the world, the TR conception of perceptual
experience puts at risk the very notion of our having any kind of contact with the
world at all. The problem with Traditional Realism in this regard is that it involves a
commitment to what I will term the 'Indirect Theory of Perception' - we pe. 'he
mind-independent world only in the sense that we perceive mental items suitably
caused by it. As both McDowell and Putnam have recognized, the success of the ER
project is crucially dependent on our being able to do away with the TR account of
perceptual experience in favor of a 'Direct Theory of Perception' . We need to
safeguard our 'commonsense realist' intuition that in perception we are in immediate
contact with the world itself. After outlining the TR account of perception and
she wing how it leads to anti-realism, I will be concerned in this chapter with
developing and defending the 'Direct Theory' of perceptual experience. In particular,
I will address the following three questions:
1) Is the Direct Theory intelligible?
2) Is the Direct Theory possible?
3) Is the Direct Theory tenable?
It will be my argument that the answer to each of these questions is YUh
[A] TRADITIONAL REALISM
In Chapter One we were concerned with the TR Sense Datum theory, on which it is
held that in perception we have access to raw data from the world. The feature of the
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Sense Datum theory that I was concerned to draw attention to there was its
characterization of this perceptual intake as 'R..A.W DATA'. My concern here is with
another feature of the Sense Datum theory - its characterization of sense data as
MENTAL items. In holding that what we have immediate perceptual access to in
sense experience is something lViENTAL, the Sense Datum theory advances what I
will term the 'Indirect Theory of Perception' .
On the Indirect Theory of Perception, which has been advanced in various forms
since Locke's Representative Realism, we are held to perceive the world 'indirectly'
through perceiving mental items (sense data, impressions, ideas etc.,) which are
suitably caused by the world and are held to thereby represent it. While we have
immediate sensory access only to these mental items, the fact that they represent the
world is held sufficient for it to be the case that we can be said to perceive the world
itself.
As both McDowell and Putnam note, the Indirect Theory ofPerception has done
much to fuel the anti-realist tum so dominant this century. The picture that emerges
from the TR view is one in which we are 'trapped' within a purely mental realm,
forever experientially cut off from mind-independent reality. It is easy to see how this
picture might lead one to question the epistemic relevance, or indeed the very
existence, of the mind-independent world. If all that we have immediate experiential
access to are mental items, and so it is to these mental items that our knowledge
claims are responsible, then why bother to bring in the independent world? If the
independent world is completely beyond our direct sensory access, then on what
grounds are we justified in thinking of it as anything other than an entirely noumenal
realm, or indeed as existing at all?
A crucial part of the ER project then is that of resisting this theory of what perception
must amount to. McDowell speaks of perceptual experience as being 'openness to the
layc til of reality' (1994, p26), and urges us to do away with 'the outer boundary' that
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is held to circumscribe the mind and so keep it at a remove from the external world
(1994, p34). In a similar vein Putnam argues that winning through to ER is seeing 'the
needlessness and unintelligibility of a picture that imposes an interface between
ourselves and the world' (1994, p487). Against TR, the ER theorist is concerned to
advance what I will refer to as the Direct Theory of Perception: what we are in
immediate experiential contact with in sense perception is n::>tsome or other mental
item but an aspect of the independent world itself.
[B] IS THE DIRECT THEORY INTELLIGIBLE?
It should be noted from the outset that ER theorists very often do make the possibility
that we have direct access to the world in sense experience seem a mysterious one. At
least a large part of the reason for this is attributable to the Wittgensteinian spirit in
which many of these philosophers write: the task of philosophy is seen as one of
making problems disappear through recalling our attention to what is obvious, rather
than that of advancing detailed constructive accounts. Putnam and McDowell are
both influenced by this kind of thinking (although to varying degrees), and Austin's
Sense and Sensibilia (which takes a strongly ER view with regard to perception) is a
paradigm example of this kind of approach. While I do share certain sympathies with
this view of what philosophy should aim to do, I also think that there is constructive
work that needs to be done, especially when refraining from engaging in the
constructive work leaves open the possibility that what is being claimed in a certain
area may seem unintelligible.
How then is direct access to the world in sense experience possible? The crucial point
to see here is that in rejecting the Indirect Theory of Perception, we do not need to
reject the claim that causation is a necessary ingredient of perception. Indeed. it
seems to me that any account of perception that does not appeal to causal chams
extending from the world to the mind will not be able to say very much about HOW
we are able to perceive the world. (It is arguably through referring to TR accounts of
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perception as 'Causal Theories', given his desire to distance his position from such
accounts, that Putnam is led to say practically nothing about the mechanisms through
which the direct perception he endorses is supposed to operate.) So in explaining how
we could be in direct experiential contact with the external world the ER theorist will
need to appeal to causation.
Part of the answer to the question about how we are able to perceive the world
directly in sense experience then will be framed in terms of the causal chains running
from objects in the world to mental states (sensory experiences) in the perceiving
subject, and the physical laws and biological structures enabling this causation.
Although a detailed account in this regard is beyond the scope of this Report, I take it
that most of us are familiar with at least some of the details here, and that we in l:I.ny
rate take it for granted that science will have no in principle difficulty providing the
explanation we require.'
Once ER appeals to causation in this way, it seems to me that perception becomes as
unmysterious on the ER view as it does on any other. There are two points which
might seem to mitigate against the availability of a causal explanation to ER however,
and which must be addressed before we move 011.
The first is that in appealing to causation as a crucial part of the answer to the
question of how perception of the external world is possible, ER might be taken to be
endorsing an externalist account of perceptual content. Although this is obviously not
an objection in and of itself, externalism about content is clearly not something: to
which we can simply help ourselves - independent argument is required. The point to
see however is that in appealing to world-mind causal chains in explaining the
mechanics of perception, ER is not thereby commi :ted to an externalist account of the
content of sense experiences. For the Epistemolog cal Realist need not hold that the
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content of such experiences is individuation-dependent on its worldly causes. All that
she is conunitted to is the (uncontentious) claim that our sensory experiences of the
world are the result of the world's exerting a causal influence on us - and it seems to
me that even the most committed internalists about content would not want to deny
this. Of course, none of this is to suggest that the ER theorist may not have good
reasons for holding an externalist position with regard to the content of sensory
experience, or that cxtemalism is a theory to be avoided at all costs (it does seem the
right account for a substantial range of content). The point is rather that ER can afford
to remain neutral on the internalism-externalisrn issue, and will be regarded as such in
this Research Report.
The second is that in appealing to causation in explaining the possibility of the
account of perception she advances, it might seem that the Epistemological Realist is
committed to some form of the Indirect Theory of Perception after all. It has been
suggested that ER explain perception in terms of the world's causing the occurrence
of sense experiences in the perceiving subject, and now it might seem that these
subjective sensory affections of the mind are playing more or less the role of the
Traditional Realist's sense-data in terms of forming an 'interface' between mind and
world. While the ER account of perceptual content fares better than that ofTR in
light of the epistemological concerns discussed in Chapter One, the worry is that from
the stand-point of perceptual experience itself the two accounts are in the same boat.
Just as on the TR account we are held to perceive the external world 'indirectly'
through perceiving the internal mental items it causes, so itmight seem that on the
ER account we are held to perceive the external world in just such an 'indirect'
fashion through perceiving the (mental) sensory experiences it causes,
Is ER then faced with the choice of abandoning the attempt to make perception
intelligible in terms of world-mind causation and leaving its occurrence wholly
: ill the case of human beings at any rate. As Michael Pendlebury argues in 'Content and Causation in
Perception' (Pendlebury, 1994), science will not be able to provide us with an answer general enough
37
mysterious on the one hand, '1nd abandoning the Direct ·~.leoryof Perception 011 the
other? It seems to me that unless this question is answered in the negative the
tenability of the ER project is seriously threatened. For an account which makes
perception wholly mysterious is a highly unsatisfactory one, and an account which
advances an Indirect Theory of Perception is the sort of account which opens the very
door to anti-realism that ER is centrally concerned to close.
Fortunately however there is a way out of the apparent dilemma confronting ER. The
thought that we need to get a grip on in order to appreciate this is the following:
sense-experiences do not constitute an interface, but a window, between mind and
world. A sense-experience is not something that passes in lieu of some aspect of the
external world, but our mode of access to it. Sensory-experience ENABLES the
perception of objects in the world, it does not TAKE THE PLACE OF such
perception. In short, sensory-experiences are to be conceived of as VEHICLES, and
not OBJECTS of perception - they are not 'VHA T we perceive but the MEANS by
which we do,
As Putnam points out, we need to be on our guard here. Itwill not do if all that is
being proposed is a new way of TALKING about perceptual goings on. That is to
say, the ER strategy suggested above will obviously not work if it amounts to nothing
more than a different description of the very same Indirect Theory of Perception.
Putnam thus warns against 'the verbal modification' which 'consists in allowing that
we can SAY we 'observe' external things', but which holds that 'this must be
UNDERSTOOD as meaning that those things cause tIS to have certain 'qualia' and
that they do so in the appropriate way' (1994, p464). In order for ER to escape the
charge of at bottom advancing an Indirect Theory of Perception, ER needs to do more
than just adopt new terminology such that 'the perception of some external object'
becomes nothing more than short-hand for 'the perception of some internal mental
to cover all possible perceptual modalities.
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item (a sense-datum; a sensory experience) which is caused by some object in the
world and so represents itt.
If the ER account of perception is to go through then, the notion that sense-experience
serves as a window and not an interface between the mind and the world must be
taken seriously. To put it in another way, if the ER account of perception is to do the
work required then the sense in which we understand sense-experiences as being
vehicles (as opposed to objects) of perception must be (close to) that in which the
sensory organs are held to be vehicles (as opposed to objects) of perception. And
indeed, while Putnam is correct to point out that we need to be on our guard against
those who claim to be friends of the ER project but whose Direct Realism amounts to
no more than Indirect Realism 'with a bit of linguistic coyer-up' (1994, p454), the
majority of philosophers currently working on ER are centrally concerned to show
that they are proposing anew THEORY of perception, and not just a new way of
TALKING about the old one. Pendlebury, for example, writes that:
...in the standard case we perceive external objects directly. Of course we
perceive them BY MEANS OF sense experiences, which are the VEHICLES
of representation and thus of perception. But to say this if ,1 say only that
sense experiences are what do the representING. In t'ie standard case they are
not also representED. In other words, they are not .hemsetves objects of
consciousness.
(1989, p218)
It is evident from what he says here that Pendlebury is advancing just the sort of
theory of perception that ER requires. That the claim that sense experiences are held
to be vehicles and not objects of perception is intended to be taken literally is evident
from the point which Pendlebury makes at the end: sense experiences are not
(standardly) objects of consciousness. If in our perception of external objects (states
of affairs) in the world we are not even conscious of the sense experiences through
which we so perceive them, the idea that WHAT we perceive are our sense
experiences can clearly get no purchase.
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The point to see here is that what distinguishes the Direct from the Indirect Theory is
not that the former does away with causal distance, but that it does away with
INTENTIONAL distance. The sense in which perception is held to be DIRECT on
the ER view is the sense in which our use oflanguage is. Just as we do not need to
talk about language in order to talk about the world, so we do not need to per ....eive
sense experiences in order to perceive the world through them.
The question then which must be answered is whether or not the Epistemological
Realist is able to provide convincing grounds for thinking that her account of
perception, once it has been spelled out in this way, is the right one. It is my
contention that she can.
Perhaps the most persuasive evidence that the Epistemological Realist is Onthe right
track derives from our reflection on our own experience of perception, as Pendlebury
points out. Consider your perception of some external state of affairs- that there is a
spotted dog directly in front of you, for example. Two things should be apparent. The
first is that what you are aware of is that a spotted dog is directly in front of you, not
that you are having a visual experience which represents a spotted dog's being in front
of you. The second is that when you attempt to become aware of the sensory
experience itself, no small amount of effort is required. And even when you do
manage to become conscious of it, you find yourself continuously slipping back into
perceiving the spotted dog itself? All of this seems to mitigate very strongly in favor
of the ER account of perception according to which sense experiences (standardly)
serve as mere vehicles, and not objects, of perception.
Pendlebury draws attention to a number of related considerations supporting a Direct
Theory of Perception here as well, one of which is worth mentioning briefly. This is
2 These points are taken from Pendlebury 's 'Sense Experiences and their Contents: a Defense of the
Propositional Account' (1989).
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that given the difficulty of bringing Sense experiences to consciousness, it is highly
unlikely that this is a skill animals and small children possess at all As I argued in
Chapter One however, there are very good reasons for not excluding these subjects
from the class of perceivers, which it seems that anyone who holds that sense
experiences are the objects of perception must.
I would thus conclude that the ER account of perception on which we are held to be
directly open to the layout of reality need be no more mysterious than any other
theory of perception. The ER theorist is as free to appeal to world-mind causal chains
in explaining the mechanism which enables perception as the TR theorist.
Importantly, appealing to causation in this way does not make the Epistemological
Realist a closet Indirect Realist: as we have seen, ER is proposing a departure in how
we understand perception, arid not simply a departure in how we talk about it. And as
I have attempted to show, the Direct Theory of Perception has the advantage over the
Indirect Theory when it comes to making sense of our actual experience of
perception.
[C] IS THE DIRECT THEORY POSSIBLE?
Even if it is acknowledged that the Direct Theory of Perception is intelligible, and
indeed desirable, it might still be argued that it cannot be right. The reason for this is
that many feel the pull of the so-called 'argument from illusion' - an argument which
aims to show that the objects of perceptual experience MUST be mental. Let us tum
then to consider this argument in some detail.
As Austin points out in Sense and Sensibilia, the argument from illusion is a two-part
argument designed to convince us that,
...we never see or otherwise perceive (or 'sense'), or anyhow we never
DIRECTLY perceive or sense, material objects (or material things), but only
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sense-data (or our own ideas, impressions, sensa, sense-perceptions, percepts,
etc.).
(1962, p2)
The first part of the argument attempts to establish that in certain atypical cases
(illusions, hallucinations, dreams etc.,) what we are perceiving must be something
mental (sense data), and the second part of the argument attempts to establish that In
light of the qualitative similarity between such sensory experiences and normal ones,
it is most rational to suppose that what we perceive in normal sensory experience
must be likewise mental.
Let us turn to the version of the argument that Putnam considers in his 1994 Dewey
Lectures, which runs as follows: Suppose that X has a drear= that is so vivid that it is
exactly like being in some place e.g., standing in front of the Taj Mahal, and suppose
further that X has never seen the Taj Mahal, X is certainly having an experience of
SOl'VIETHING, and it is certainly not an experience of the Taj Mahal, or indeed of
any physical object. On the basis of this we must conclude that X is having an
experience of something MENTAL. Suppose next that a little while later X pays a
visit to the Taj Mahal, and has a perceptual experience EXACTL Y LIKE the one she
had while she was dreaming. Given that We agreed that what X perceived in the first
instance wac something mental, surely we should say the same in this case too? It
seems implausible to imagine that things as radically different as a physical building
and a mental sense datum could seem exactly alike. Consequently we must hold that
in the second case too what X perceived was something mental The important
difference between the two cases is that the sensory experience in the second case
was caused by the Taj Mahal, while in the first case it was not. 'On the second
occasion she was indirectly perceiving the Taj Mahal and on the first occasion she
was not even indirectly perceiving it; but what she immediately perceived on both
occasions were her sense data' (Putnam, 1994, p472).
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What is the Epistemological Realist to say about the argument from illusion? TIle
challenge that it. oses cannot go unanswered, since in the absence of any ER
rejoinder it will seem that we need to posit sense data as the objects of immediate or
direct perception. The first point to note is one that Austin makes - it is simply taken
for granted by the argument that in the case of a dream or a halluc' 'lation we must be
perceiving SOMETHING. And surely it is far more natural to say in such cases that
we are perceiving NOTHING AT ALL? (Think here of how natural it would be to
say to someone who was in the throws of a hallucination and claimed to see a pink
elephant: 'But there is nothing there!') Of course it might SEEM to us at the time that
we are perceiving something, but there is a valid distinction to be drawn between its
seeming to me that I am perceiving something and my actually perceiving something.
One might object at this point that even if the TR theorist cannot HELP HERSELF to
the idea that we perceive something mental in the case of dreams and hallucinations,
she can nevertheless introduce the idea that we perceive sense data both in these
atypical cases and in those of ordinary (veridical) perception, on the basis that it is the
best explanation of the qualitative similarity between the two. It is important to
remember the point that Sellars raises in this regard however - what does the
explanatory work here need not be some item of which we are conscious. In light of
this it is evident that the ER theorist has an explanation at hand too - something in the
causal chain which facilitates perception will be common to both cases.'
Indeed, it seems to me that the proposed E.t<.explanation has the advantage over that
ofTR. As Austin points out, the normal and atypical cases are generally far more
qualitatively distinct than the TR theorist makes out. It seems to me that our
explanation should take cognizance of this fact just as much as it does of the fact that
on occasion the two cases can be qualitatively very similar. The ER explanation has
no problem accounting for this: two very different things are going on in the two
cases. Indeed, ER is able to account for the fact that dreams can seem MORE 01'
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LESS like cases of actual perception as well: the causal chains will be MORE or
LESS similar. On the other hand, it does not seem that the Traditional Realist is able
to do much by way of explaining either why the atypical cases are most often NOT
qualitatively indistinguishable from the 'normal' ones, or why they should differ in
degrees in this regard.
[D] IS THE ClRECT THEORY TENABLE?
Thus. ;"('(;t Theory of Perception is both intelligible and
jossible. 1'1' . however, for at first glance it might seem that
the Direct Theory is ne .Ii e. The point to see here is that in advancing
the Direct Theory C' t .f~ ts ofthe mind-world relation as being a
far closer one than realism has traditic •. .Ily held it to be. And the worry might arise in
this regard that it makes the relation TOO close.
(i) McDowell and the charge ofldealism
The first point whl '11must be noted is that ER needs to be ver; careful about how it
unpacks its central thesis of' openness to the lay-out of reality' such that the relation
between mind ~nd world does not become so close that the distinction between the
two is lost entirely. That this is a real danger for ER can be best appreciated by
examining McDowell's Natural Realism. As Michael Friedman argues in 'Exorcising
the Philosophical Tradition: Comments on John McDowell's MIND AND WORLD'
(Friedman, 1996), it is not clear that Natural Realism is not in danger of collapsing
into the -.:-ry idealism cum coherentism that McDowell is centrally concerned to
avoid.
According to McDowell's Natural Realism, it is not only the content of sensory
expr nence that is conceptual - the world to which we have access through such
. T, ,):i is ibvic ',sly not to say that the causal chains will be identical.
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experience must be as well. As we saw in Chapter One, McDowell's conception of
what justification must amount to entails that justificatory relations can only hold
between conceptually structured items. On McDowell's view, justification can nc .er
be a matter of brute causal constraint on belief formation - the constraint must also be
rational. It will clearly not do on McDowell's account then for our very having of
conceptual perceptual states to be a matter of the world's having exerted some brute
causal force upon i.s, if we are to be justified in forming a world view on the basis of
perceptual experience. The world must be held to exert a rational constraint in this
regard, on pain of invoking what de Gaynesford calls the 'myth of the
CONCEPTUALISED given' - 'all content is always already conceptual; but it is
instantiated by impacts from outside the sphere of concepts' (1996, pS04). As
McDowell writes,
This talk of impingements on our senses is not an invitation to suppose that
the whole dynamic system, the medium within which we think, is held in
place by extra-conceptual links to something outside it. That is just to stress
again that we must not picture an outer boundary around the sphere of the
conceptual, with rea .ty outside the boundary impinging inward on the system.
Ary impingements across such an outer boundary could only be causal and
not rational.;
(1994, p34)
On McDowell's view then, the world to which we have experiential access is itself
compris d cf'thinkable contents. Just as any of our intentional states is conceptual,
and as such is capable of entering into the rational relations constitutive of the space
of reasons, so too the world is not external to this logical space, Reailw itself falls
within the space of reasons - the conceptual sphere L completely unbounded
It is worth pointing out that McDowell's radical conceptualism is no' entailed by his
Direct Theory of Perception. as he sometimes seems to suggest. We must guard
against confusing the MANNER or MODE in which something is represented, with
WHAT is thereby represented, It seems to me that there is 110 reas- 1 in principle why
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on" could not hold a view in terms of which the content of sensory experience is held
to be conceptual, a Direct Theory of Perception is advanced, and yet the world itself
is characterized as non-conceptual. Of course, such a view might be seen as
problematic for a number of independent reasons, some of which were outlined in
Chapter One - the point here is simply that it is not an inherently incoherent one.
McDowell's claim that the world is conceptual is one that causes a significant amount
of discomfort, given his commitment to realism. It seems extremely implausible to
suggest that something which is concept-laden - which the world must be If the Myth
of the Given as MeDowell characterizes it is to be avoided - could exist as such
independently ofthe human (or any) mind. On Mcfrowell's view, to place something
in the conceptual sphere is to place it in the space of reasons (1994, p5), to attribute to
it the kind of intelligibility proper to meaning (1994, p71-72), and to see it as
standing in the rational relations constitutive of this logical space (1994, pS). Surely it
is not the case that meaning resides in the mind-independent world, that the states of
affairs making up reality stand in relations of implication to one another in the sense
that propositions do'?
McDowell himself is well aware of this problem. He writes,
According LO the picture I have been recommending, our sensibility yields
states and occurrences with conceptual content. That enables us to see an
experiencing subject as open to facts. The conceptual sphere does not exclude
the world we experience. TJ put it another way: what we experience is not
external to the realm of the kind of intelligibility that is proper to meaning.
But in so far as what we experience includes merely natural facts, this can
look like a crazily nostalgic attempt to re-enchant the natural world ....
(1994, :172)
The image of''re-enchantment' McDowell appeal, to here is designed to capture the
difference between the kind of intelligibility we find in something as a result of
placing it in the space of reasons, and that which natural science finds in its subject
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matter as a result of placing it in the realm of law. The scientific revolution resulted in
the 'disenchantment of nature' ir. that the natural world became 'emptied of meaning' -
the way to render a natural phenomenon comprehensible was no longer to approach it
as one would a text, but to see it as a law-governed process. Crucially, McDowell
thinks that any satisfactory account of mind-world relations must fully respect the
claim that the subject matter of natural science IS dis-enchanted in the relevant sense
- he hails the marking off of the realm of law from the space of reasons as 'an
achievement of modem thought' signifying 'intellectual progress' (1994, pTi). So it
must be shown that Natural Realism does not lead to re-investing the world of science
with meaning.
It is worth pointing out that the contrast between the space of reasons and the realm
of law is central to McDowell's diagnosis of why the idea that sensory experience is
conceptual has not traditionally been viewed as so much as a possibility. According
to McDowell, the obstacle that stands in the way of embracing his account of sensory
content is the deeply pervasive 'naturalism that equates nature with the realm of law'
(1994, p77). Given that sensibility is surely a natural phenomenon (it is something
that we share with 'mere animals'), and given the assumption that what makes
something natural is its placement in the realm of Jaw, then, argues McDowell, it
becomes impossible to see how sensibility could be conceptual. According to the
naturalism under consideration, if sensory intake is a natural occurrence, then it is
what it is in virtue of its place in the realm of law, To then claim that sensory intake is
conceptual is incoherent, since this is to implv that its being what it is is also a mutter
of its placement in the contrasting logical space of reasons. In order for Natural
Realism to emerge as a tenable position then, it must be shown how our sensibility
COULD be conceptual, given that it is surely a purely natural fact about the human
animal.
The two problems raised above are closely related - both result from a perceived gulf
between reason and nature, between the space of reusons and the realm of law.
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Crucially, McDowell does not think that the way out is to embrace a 'bald naturalism',
according to which the gulf between nature as the realm of law on the one hand, and
the space of reasons on the other, is simply denied. On McDowell's view the space of
reasons is sui generis in comparison with the realm oflaw, and its structure cannot be
captured or reconstructed out of 'conceptual materials that already belong in a natural-
scientific depiction of nature' (1994, p73). But McDowell sees a 'rampant platonism',
according to which the space of reasons is viewed as a structure entirely divorced
from nature, as equally untenable. On this view, the space of reasons acquires super-
natural status, and the human capacity to operate within it comes to 'look like an
occult power' (1994, p83).
The way out of the dilemma posed by the incompatibility of the realm of law and the
space of reasons, and so the answer to the two worries we ate concerned with,
according to McDowell, is a 'relaxed naturalism of second nature'. We need to refuse
to equate the idea of being natural with that of having a place in the realm of law. The
domain of the natural includes the realm of law to be sure, but it is not exhausted by it
- it incorporates the space of reasons as well. In order to secure this relaxed
naturalism we need to do no more than point to the 'second nature' of the human
animal- our nature as rational beings. We need to see that becoming a rational animal
is a natural part of the ordinary maturation of the human being. In coming to
maturity, the human animal is initiated into the space of reasons .hrough the
acquisition of conceptual capacities, whereupon she comes to see everything from
this perspective. Crucially, in so acquiring these capacities the human being is doing
nothing more than actualizing the nature she is born with the disposition to develop,
given the right sort of upbringing. This should be enough, argues McDowell, to
diffuse the tbreat of 'rampant platonism', since it shows that 'second nature could not
float free of potentialities that belong to a normal human organism' (1994, p84).
It is evident how McDowell's relaxed naturalism is supposed to solve the second of
the two problems mentioned earlier. It enables us to say that our capacity to operate
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within the space 01 reasons is a natural fact about us, and so there is no obstacle to the
idea that the operations of our purely natural faculty of sensibility are conceptually
structured. What is less clear, as Friedman points out, is how relaxed naturalism is
supposed to provide an answer to the first problem. How is reflection on the second
nature of the human animal supposed to show that Natural Realism does not involve a
re-enchantment of the empirical world APART from human beings? After outlining
his relaxed naturalism of second nature, McDowell simply concludes that we can
thereby keep nature 'partially enchanted, but without lapsing into pre-scientific
superstition' (1994, p85). The partial re-enchantment of nature McDowell speaks of
here must refer to the fact that nature stands revealed as comprising not only fue
realm of law, but also the second nature of the human animal which is governed
exclusively by the rational relations constituting the sui generis space of reasons.
What is not immediately obvious is why McDowell thinks that this insight enables us
to see how we can hold both that the realm of law is 'devoid of meaning' and that 'the
realm of law, not just the realm of meaningful doings, is not external to the
conceptual' (1994, p97).
Why might McDowell think that reflecting 011 the fact that human beings experience
the world from within the space of reasons, or that they EXPERIENCE the world AS
falling within the space of reasons (as a result of the conceptual capacities drawn into
play in sensory experience), provides the solution to the threat of re-enchantment?
The only answer which makes any sense here is that McDowell, in saying that the
world is conceptual, means oi.ly that human beings experience it as such. Natural
Realism does not involve the re-enohantment of nature because the world does not
fall within the space of reasons in and of itself - it is the human perceiver who brings
the world into the space of reasons in virtue of her second nature.
The sense in which the conceptual is unbounded then, the sense in which there is
nothing external to it, is that once one has acquired one's second nature, one
EXPERIENCES the world as being conceptual. The realm of law does not need to
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impact upon us across an outer boundary because we bring the realm of law into the
space of reasons in sense experience. In this way we are able to conceive of the causal
impacts from the realm of law upon our sensibility precisely as elements of the space
of reasons requiring our rational response. There is nothing outside the conceptual
realm to which we need to relate it because once we have been initiated into the space
of reasons we perceive everything, including the empirical world, from within this
point of view. The realm of law gives rise to the space of reasons, whereupon the
space of reasons becomes completely unbounded. And it is as a result of the
unboundedness of the conceptual, understood in this sense, that the myth of the
('conceptualized') given is avoided.
If this is the correct reading of McDowell (and I can see no other which makes sense
of why he thinks that appealing to our second nature as rational animals should
vindicate Natural Realism of the charge of re-enchantrnent), then it seems to me to be
highly problematic on a number cf counts. The problem 1 am concerned with here
however is the one noted by Friedman - it is not clear that Mcfrowell'r account is not
in danger of collapsing into some or other form of idealism. Paradoxically, through
avoiding a too close construal of the mind-world relation whereby the mind-
independent world is held to be conceptual, it seems that McDowell has put the very
mind-independence of the world at risk.
On McDowell's view, the world that our thought is about, the world which we have
perceptual access to, is the world 'as it appears or makes itself manifest to the
experiencing subject' (1994, p39). The world we are said to have knowledge of is the
one we bring into the sphere of the conceptual when we acquire our second nature.
Now the crucial problem for Natural Realism here can best be brought out by
considering the following question: what secures the fact on McDowell's account that
the world which our perceptual experiences are of. and so our empirical thought is
about, L; the real mind-independent world'? As we have seen, McDowell holds that
we conceptualize the realm of law in sense experience. The question which needs to
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be answered is: Given that the realm of law is not conceptual in and of itself, what
assurance can Mclfo-: '''!ll give us that the world to which we are rationally responsive
is not partly a produce of our own minds'!
McDowell is t·" of the fact that Natural Realism - through entailing that the sphere
ofthe conceptual is unbounded and so that the understanding is not rationally
responsive to anything outside of it - can seem susceptible to the charge of idealism.
We might worry that if the world itself falls within the conceptual sphere, then the
independence of the world of our thinking about it is compromised. In response to
this worry McDowell argues that Natural Realism gives us as satisfactory an account
oftheindepend
McDowell's VII'
'f reality as we could reasonably require. The reason for this on
.at the faculty of sensibility is entirely passive - in sense
experience we find ourselves 'saddled' with conceptual content before we have any
choice in the matter. It is this notion of the passivity of sense experience that enables
us to capture the sense in which reality is independent of our thinkir..g about it, and so
available to exert the required external constraint that saves us from the coherentist
image of empirical thought as a 'frictionless spinning'. For what the passivity of
sensibility in essence shows is that while the world does not lie outside the sphere of
thinkable contents, it is independent of the ACT of thinking, of our thinking or
judging that such and such is the case. McDowell thus concludes that while Natural
Realism entails that the facts which constitute the world are conceptual, it specifically
does not entail that they are to be equated with exercises of conceptual
CAPACITIES, and so the charge of idealism cannot be made to stick.
McDowell's response does not address the real worry, however, which is not that the
way the world appears to us is dependant on our ACTIVE THll ~KING about it, but
rather that it is nevertheless dependant on our MINDS. To be sure, that sensory
experience is passive does secure the fact that our empirical thinking is not entirely
'free' "; J};:rl l'!e operations of the conceptual system are not completely 'up to us', The
problem however, as Friedman points out, is that 'the idea of passive receptivity is not
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yet the idea of constraint from an independent objective world' (1996, p443). The fact
that our perceptual states are 'thrust upon us' so to speak does not mean that they
afford us access to an independent reality. And as Friedman notes, McDowell is well
aware of this fact given his discussion of impressions of inner sense. Regarding these
impressions, it is McDowell's claim that while we are just as passive with respect to
them as we are to the impressions of outer sense, it is only the latter through which
we are able to perceive the independent world. The crucial question then becomes
that of how McDowell distinguishes between impressions of outer and inner sense
such that the former are expressions of .onstraint by an independent world while the
latter are not.
As Friedman points out, McDowell's answer is extremely illuminating here. It seems
to be McDowell's view that what makes an outer experience an experience of the
independent world is nothing other than the fact that it is conceived as such by the
perceiver. McDowell writes,
In 'outer experience', a subject is passively saddled with conceptual contents,
drawing into operation capacities seamlessly integrated into a conceptual
repertoire that she employs in the continuing activity of adjusting her world
view, so as to enable it to pass a scrutiny of its rational credentials. It is this
integration that makes it possible for us to conceive of experience as
awareness, or at least seeming awareness, of a reality independent of
experience.
(1994, p31).
On McDowell's view then, a veridical 'outer experience' provides us with access to
independent reality only because its conceptual content enables it to be taken as doing
so. On the other hand, while an 'inner experience' is just as passive, 'the mode of
integration (of its conceptual L ntent with that of the rest of the system) ...is not such
as to confer independence on the objects of awareness' (1994, p37). In the end then,
that independent reality is in McDowell's picture at all is 110t held to be secured by the
passive receptivity of sensibility, but rather by the idea that we TAKE the operations
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of sensibility to provide us with access to the independent world. It is the fact that we
experience the constraint on our empirical thinking (in the form of the passivity of
sense experience) as being imposed on us by independent reality, and not the fact that
the existence of the constraint itself implies an independent reality, that is supposed to
diffuse the threat ofidealism.
The problem, as Friedman points out, is that far from showing the fear of idealism to
be ungrounded, McDowell's response seems positively to encourage it. Through
holding that our outer experiences are only expressions of constraint by the
independent wc.rld in virtue of being taken as such by the perceiver, 'the crucial
notion of independence is, in the end, given a purely coherence-theoretic reading'
(Friedman, 1996, p444, fn.).
The point to see here is that there is no other way McDowell CAN draw the
distinction between inner and outer experiences. and so provide an account of the
independence of the world, given his theoretical resources. The problem is that on
McDowell's account the conceptual sphere is unbounded for rational creatures -
everything they experience falls within it. And the sense in which this is the case is
not the now reassuring idea that world falls within the space of reasons in and of
itself. but that we experience it as doing so. Given that the conceptual is in this sense
unbounded, there is nothing external to it to which we can relate it. And so now we
seem trapped in the realm of the conceptual, unable to ever make contact with the
mind-independent reality (the realm of law) which lies forever out of our view.
The crucial problem with McDowell's view is that his theoretical commitments
prevent him from being able to give the right kind of account of the relation between
the space of reasons and the realm of law. The reassurance that we want from
McDowell is that the conceptual contents of sensory experience bear on or represent
the world external to the human mind. And that is precisely the reassurance that
McDowell is unable to give us, since it necessarily involves an appeal to some
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relation cutting across a boundary separating the conceptual from the non-conceptual,
if we are to escape re-enchanting the world. That our experiences are OF the (mind-
independent) world, that the concepts that are brought into play in sense experience
can be said to accurately REPRESENT it, must remain on McDowell's account a
matter of faith. And this seems to make the fear of idealism entirely appropriate.
When we remember that it is McDowell's account of justification that leads him to
require that the conceptual be unbounded in the first place, we have yet another
reason for rejecting that account.
(ii) Appearances and things in themselves
Now it is evident that the account advanced in Chapter One is not in danger of
making the mind-world relation too close in the way that was seen to pose a problem
for McDowell. As a result of embracing the more modest account of justification
defended earlier, the ER theorist can allow for justificatory relations obtaining across
a boundary circumscribing the conceptual sphere. We saw in Chapter One that being
able to appeal to an extemalist conception of justification enables ER to give a more
satisfactory account of both animal and human perception, and the relation between
them. We are now in a position to appreciate a further advantage of reliabilism - it
enables us to bring the realm of law into the picture AS the realm of law and so
provide the required reassurance that our sensory experiences afford us access to the
mind-independent world. The ER theorist who takes the route recommended here is
able to say something about the relationship between states of affairs in the mind-
independent world and the propositional contents of sensory experiences such that the
latter can be said to represent the former.
That ER is not guilty of courting the charge of idealism in the manner of McDowell's
Natural Realism is well and good. But an account along the lines of Natural Realism
is not the only one that might be accused of making the relationship between the
mind and the world out to be too close. While E~ does not entail that the distinction
i
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between the mind and the world is so close that it is in da, .:<:1' of collapsing, it can
seem that it is still too close to be acceptable.
To see what is at issue here, it is necessary to say a little more about the conception of
the mind-world relation advanced by TR. In essence, the TR account of perception
encourages the view that there is a fundamental 'gap' between the mind and the world,
such that what we are in direct sensory contact with is something distinct from the
world itself. While TR maintains that our appearances nevertheless represent the
world, the way is now open for the anti-realist to exploit this 'gap'. As long as we are
:leld to perceive the world only indirectly (through our direct sensory contact with the
mental items (e.g., sense-data) it is held to Gause), this leaves room for the world to be
one way and what we experience 'of it' altogether another.
The point to see here is that we have become extremely comfortable with this
conception of a fundamental 'gap' between mind and world - the appearance-thing in
itself divide bas become integral to our thinking about a whole range of o-her issues.
For example, the very different pictures of physical objects arising from physics and
ordinary perceptual experience respectively, are resolved in the view that physical
objects only SEEM to have the properties that sense experience presents them as
having - what such objects REALLY are is nothing but swir.'ng masses of sub-
atomic particles. Or again, the idea that what organisms perceive is to a large extent
determined by their own biological interests is typicaliy cashed out in terms of the
idea that what we perceive in sense experience is to a greater or lesser degree THER3
FOR US, and not otherwise.
In light of the above, it can come to seem that the ER conception of tile world that
emerges from its theory of perception is hopelessly naive. For what the Direct Theory
of Perception tells us is that there is no ultimate appearance-thing in itself divide: the
world to which we have direct sensory access is the real world. On the ER account,
the states of affairs that the content of (veridical) sensory experience represents, such
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facts as the dog's being in front of the tree, are objective constituents of mind-
independent reality. And the problem is that once we have abandoned the distinction
between .ippearances and things in themselves, it seems that we have lost a host of
other distinctions that were cashed out in terms of it as well. It now seems that we
cannot say that physical objects are at bottom a mass of sub-atomic particles. or that
much of our perception is interest-dependant. And this, most would argue, is simply
unacceptable. If ER is to emerge as being at all tenable, it must be shown that doing
away with the appearance-thing in itself divide does not lead to a hopelessly naive
conception oftl.~ world and our relation to it.
The task confronting us then is that of showing how we can retain the distinctions and
ideas that we are unwilling (for very good reasons) to abandon, w, 'e getting rid of
the framework in terms of which the latter have come to be cast. We need to be able
to show how we can hold both that our experience for the most part gives us direct
access to physical objects as they are in themselves, AND that these objects are
comprised of collections of sub-atomic particles, We need to make it intelligible how
it can be the case that what we perceive in sense experience is in some very leal sense
determined by our biological interests, AND tha, ~he states of affairs that we so
perceive are constituents of the mind-independent world.
One way out for ER which might suggest itself here is to draw a distinction between
what it is that we perceive in sense experience, and the way that we percei' _:it to be.
According to this line of thought. the Epistemological Realist can claim that while
WHAT we are in direct contact with in sense experience is the mind-independent
world, the shape that our experience of the world takes is to a large ex' nt influenced
by our mode of access to it. On this view it is claimed that in r crceptual experience
our faculty of sensibility imposes some or other kind of framework over the raw stuff
of the world, such tbt we are only able to perceive the latter through the grid of the
former. The suggestion then is that the Epistemological Realist 111 hold that what we
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have direct access to in sense experience is the mind-independent world, while
denying that this world is anything very much like the way we perceive it to be.
It does net seem to me that this is a possible route for the ER theorist to take,.
however. The crucial problem is that it makes the world of our experience, and so the
world that our empirical thinking is about, to an indeterminate extent the product of
our own minds. And this is the very idealist sentiment that ER is concerned to dispel.
On the suggested response, the ordinary world of objects like dogs and trees and
properties like spotted and tall is held to be the product of our imposition of some
structural framework onto a reality in which no such things REALLY exist. And the
problem is that it is the reality of the ordinary world that ER is concerned to defend.
It is important to note that the objection to the ER response under consideration is not
that it involves a return to the TR Indirect Theory of Perception. The account is very
specific about the fact that we do have direct access to the independent world ill sense
experience. The problem with the account is that we do not have ENOUGH direct
access to it - too much of WHAT we experience ISmind-dependant. This point serves
to bring out thar not just any Direct Theory of Perception will do. The kind of Direct
Theory which ER needs to embrace is one which says not only that we directly
perceive the mind-independent world in sense experience, but which further holds
that sense experience provides us with encugh access to the independent world for it
to be the case that the world more or less is the way se perceive it to be.
That I say 'more or less' here is important. Itmay well be the case that our sensory
access to the world does to some extent shape what we thereby perceive, and it need
not be the case that sensory experience provides us with equally as much access to
everything which we perceive. What is important for present purposes however is
that the Epistemological Realist cannot afford to make the gap between the way the
world objectively is, and the way the world appears to us to be, too wide, on pain of
abandoning ER itself.
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How then IS ER to answer the charge of making the mind-world relation out to be too
close? How is ER to make it intelligible for example that it can be the case that while
the world more or less is the way we perceive it to be in sense experience, the objects
to which we have sensory access are in fact swirling masses of sub-atomic particles?
Again, how is ER to retain the idea that what we perceive in sense experience is in
some very real sense determined by our biological interests, while at the same time
holding that what we perceive in sense experience is the mind-independent world?
The answer to these questions can be summed up as follows: ER NEED NOT, AND
SHOULD NOT, HOLD THAT WE HAVE SENSORY ACCESS TO ALL
ASPECTS OF THE MIND-INDEPENDENT WORLD IN SENSE EXPERIENCE.
The ER theorist can accommodate all of the distinctions and ideas necessary for an
acceptably sophisticated understanding of the world and our relationship to it, without
abandoning the idea that the world of our experience is the real world, if she further
holds that our sensory experience does not open us up to all aspects of reality.
The way out for ER then is to hold that while the aspects of the world to which
sensory experience gives us access are more or less the way we perceive them as
beir 6, these aspects are not exhaustive of the world in its entirety, Things like dogs
and trees exist in the mind-independent world, and they objectively instantiate (most
of) the properties we experience them as having. The point is that they instantiate a
whole range of other properties to which we ate not open in sense experience as well
- like the properties attributed to them by physics. (Indeed, the properties of physical
objects that form the subjec matter of science are likely to explain those to which we
have sensory access.) Crucially, ER holds that we must not privilege the properties of
the world that physics is concerned with over those which we have sensory access to -
both are equally as real and mind-independent.
It is evident from what has been said so far that ER can accommodate the idea that
what we perceive is determined by our biological interests as well. The claim that
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what we perceive is interest-dependant, and so in aome sense there for us and not
otherwise, can be taken in two ways. It can mean that EmWORLD of our
experience is to a large extent dependant on the kinds of creatures we are, and it can
also mean that WHICH ASPECTS of the mind-independent world we experience is
dependent on the kinds of creatures we are. The ER theorist is then able to fully
accommodate the fact that the way a creature with one set of biological needs will
experience the world to be is likely to be very different to the way another creature
with entirely different biological needs will. This does not mean however that the real
world must be very different from the way either experiences it, or that the two
creatures experience two different worlds. All that the Epistemological Realist needs
to say is that the differing biological interests of the two creatures will be responsible
for the fact that they have sensory access to different aspects of the mind-independent
world.
I would thus conclude that through recognizing that we are not open to all aspects of
reality in sense experience the ER theorist is able to give as sophisticated an account
of the world and our relationship to it as any other, while doing away with the
appearance-thing in itself divide. It should be pointed out however that in advancing
the ER line of response outlined above I have up until now made an important
assumption, about which something needs to be said.
(iii) The Manifest and the Scientific Images
It has been assumed up to now that the picture of physical objects arising from
science, and that arising from our perceptual experience, are compatible. It has been
proposed that the Epistemological Realist maintain that physical objects instantiate
both the properties which we have sensory access to and those which form the subject
matter of physics. In light of this it is evident that if these two kinds of properties turn
out to be incompatible then the proposed ER response cannot go through. If it should
turn out to be the case that it is impossible for a tree to (objectively) be both the way
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we perceive it to be in sense experience, and a collection of sub-atomic particles, then
it would seem that the Epistemological Realist has no choice but to be an anti-realist
about scientific entities and properties. The question to which we must turn then is
whether there is any reason to think that the two pictures of physical objects arising
from science and perceptual experience respectively are at bottom incompatible. In
'Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man' Wilfred Sellars argues that there is
(Sellars, 1971b).
Sellars draws a distinction between what he terms the 'manifest image of man-in-the-
world' and the 'scientific image' thereof. The manifest image refers to the conception
or picture of the world and our relation to it which is the result of 'sophisticated
common sense' (1971 b, p20). It is not to be distinguished from the scientific image on
the grounds that it is 'pre-scientific', 'uncritical' or 'naive', however (1971 b, p6).
Indeed, the manifest image is partly the result of employing a type of reasoning
appropriately called scientific on Sellars' view - that of 'correlational induction'
(1971b, p7). What distinguishes the scientific image from the manifest one is that the
former is the conception of the world and our relation to it which is the result of
POSTULATIONAL theory (l97Ib, pI9). As Sellars writes,
...the contrast I have in mind is not that between an UNSCIENTIFIC
conception of man- in-the-world and a SCIENTIFIC one, but between that
conception which limits itself to what correlational techniques can tell us
about perceptibh \ and introspectible events and that which postulates
imperceptible objects and events for the purpose of explaining correlations
among perceptibles.
(I971b, pI9).
The question we are concerned to answer then carl be re-phrased in Sellars' terms as
follows: are the manifest and scientific images compatible with regard to their
respective accounts of the physical objects of our experience? If physical objects
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objectively are as we perceive them to be, can they also be constituted by collections
of sub-atomic particles?
I: is Sellars' arr=ment that the above question must be answered in the negative. The
crucial point to see accordir .., Sellars is that the scientific image construes physical
objects as systems of imperceptible objects which do not themselves instantiate the
perceptible properties which we experience physical objects as having. Now Sellars
himself acknowledges that there is 'nothing immediately paradoxical about the view
that an object can be both a perceptible object with perceptible qualities AND a
system of imperceptible objects, none of which hal:'!perceptible qualities' (1971 b,
p26). The reason for this is that it seems plainly obvious that systems can instantiate
properties not instantiated by anyone of their parts. Sellars gives the examnle of a
ladder here - it is evident that a collection of pieces of wood can be a ladder while no
individual piece is. The point to nore however, argues Sellars, is that in this case we
can say that the system instantiates the property of being a ladder IN VIRTUE OF the
relations which hold between its parts and the properties these parts themselves
instantiate. In light of this Sellars introduces the following principle: 'EVERY
PROPERTY OF A SYSTEM OF OBJECTS CONSISTS OF PROPERTIES OF,
AND RELATIONS BETWEEN, ITS CONSTITUENTS' (1971b, p27).
The problem with viewing 'manifest objects' as systems comprised of 'scientific
objects' on Sellars' view, is that to do so violates the principle introduced above.
Sellars argues that the perceptible properties ofthe objects of our experience cannot
be viewed as consisting of the properties of, and relations between, the sub-atomic
particles of the scientific image. He cites the example of a pink ice cube in this
regard. It is Sellars contention that the property of being pink cannot be construed as
being made up of a number of imperceptible properties in the way in which the
property of being a ladder is made up of 'being cylindrical (the rungs), rectangular
(the frame), wooden. etc' (1971b, p26). In sense experience we perceive the ice cube
as instantiating the property of being 'homogeneously pink' - as being 'pink through
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and through ,.,a pink continuum, all the regions of which, however small, are pink'
(1971 b, p26). And the problem, according to Sellars, is that it is impossible to see
how this 'ultimate homogeneity of the manifest image' could be a matter of the
relations and properties obtaining in the ultimately non-homogeneous scientific
realm. It simply cannot be made intelligible that the 1-.operty of being
HOMOGENOUSL Y pink consists of the relations between a COLLECTION of
imperceptible particles.
Sellars thus concludes that the respective pictures of physical objects arising from the
manifest and scientific images are incompatible. A physical object cannot be both the
way we perceive it to be in sense experience and what physics tells us it is. In light of
this we can retain a commitment to the mind-independence of manifest objects only
by becoming scientific anti-realists, and this is on Sellars' view too high a price to
pay.
While I am in agreement with Sellars that ifER does entail scientific anti-realism
then we have every reason to treat it with suspicion, I do not think that it does. In
particular, I do not think that Sellars' argument succeeds in showing that the manifest
and scientific images are incompatible with regard to physical objects.
It is important to note that in many ways Sellars' choice of the pink ice cube to
illustrate his point is a fortunate one for his own purposes. There does seem to be
something strange about the idea that the property of being homogeneously pink is to
be explained in terms of the properties of and relations between sub-atomic particles.
What it is crucial to see, however, is that there are a whole range of perceptible
properties which do not seem to face the same problem. Examples here include the
internal integrity, the size, the mass and the spatio-temporal Iocation of objects in the
manifest image. There seems to be nothing problematic for example, about the idea
that the perceptible property instantiated by a dog of being a discreet entity - of
having its head, legs, torso etc., stand to one another in a far more intimate relation
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than they do to the tree behind it - is a matter of the relations between and properties
of the sub-atomic particles of which it is composed.
It seems to me then that even if we accept Sellars' argument, the most it can be held
to establish is that CERTAIN of the properties that we experience objects as
instantiating are incompatible with what science tells us about them. And as was
noted in part (ii) of this section, the ER theorist can allow that objects need not be as
we perceive them to be in ALL respects. The qt.estion to which we must now turn is
whether Sellars' argument secures even this much, however. In particular, does
Sellars' argument succeed in establishing that the property of being pink cannot be
one instantiated by objects as they are in themselves?
I said earlier that Sellars' choice of the example of the pink ice cube was a fortunate
one - there does seem to be something prima facie problematic with holding that the
property of being homogeneously pink is a matter of the properties of and relations
between a collection of sub-atomic particles. Part of the reason for this seeming
difficulty is that the property of being coloured is one oftb . so-calledsecondary
qualities'. A distinction has long been drawn bv TR between properties like mass,
shape, size, etc., on the one hand, and those like colour, texture, warmth, etc., on the
other. While the former are held to represent objects as they are in themselves, of the
latter it is argued that they represent only the ways in which such objects affect the
human faculty of sensibility. The so-called secondary properties on the TR account
then are not instantiated outside of the human mind - objects are not REALLY
coloured or sweet or fragrant. The TR argument in this regard typically turns on the
fact that we often experience these properties to change while nothing in the object
that we take to instantiate tnem does. Russell for example argues that because the
shaded parts of a table and those that are in glare look different from one another, the
colours which we experience the table as having cannot be properties of the table
itself.
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Now it seems to me that part of the reason why we might find ourselves initially
sympathetic towards Sellars' argument is that we are under the sway of the TR
account of colour as a secondary property. The point to see however is that both
Sellars and the Traditional Realist are guilty of failing to draw a distinction between
properties and concepts. Both think that because our concept of e.g., being coloured
involves the idea of 'ultimate homogeneity'. that the property of being coloured must
as well. Once such a distinction is made however, there is nOproblem with holding
that the PROPERTY of being pink is in the table while we acknowledge that what
this property amounts to is nothing very much like what the CONCEPT of being pink
does.
To see what is being suggested here consider the account ofthe so-called 'secondary
properties' proposed by Putnam in his 1994 Dewey Lectures. Putnam suggests that
we think of the property of being pink, for example, as that of having the potentiality
of having a certain (range of) 'looks' under a certain (set of) condition(s). The
property of being pink, of having the aforesaid potentiality, WILL be a matter of the
sub-atomic structure of the object which instantiates it. The property of being pink is
IN - it is instantiated by - the ice-cube. The 'looks' themselves, while certainly
RELATIONAL properties of the object, need not in this case be MENTAL.4 That we
are the kinds of animals we are, that we are viewing the object from the distance we
are and that we are Viewing it under the conditions we are may all be required for the
apprehension of these relational properties, but this is no way entails that such
properties exist only in our minds.
I would thus conclude then that against Sellars the manifest and scientific images are
not incompatible even with regard to the case of the pink ice cube. The property of
4 It is worth taking note of the fact that many have recently advanced accounts along these and similar
lines. David Lewis for example in 'Naming the Colours' (Lewis. 1997) distinguishes between 'red'
and 'experience of red', holding of the former that it is 'the surface property of things which typically
causes experience of red in people who have such things before their eyes' (1997, p327). For another
recent account along similar lines see Colin McGinn (1996).
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being pink - of having the potentiality of looking to be a pink continuum to a certain
range of creatures in a certain range of circumstances - is a property instantiated by
objects in 'the scientific image' itself.
In this chapter I have tried to show that the central ER thesis of 'openness to reality' is
intelligible, possible and tenable. Not only can E:Kgive a satisfactory account of how
perception enables empirical knowledge, but also it can give the right kind of account
of perception itself. Before resting the case for the ER project however, there is one
important issue to which we must turn. For one of the grounds upon which TR has
been most criticized concerns its account of the relationship between our empirical
knowledge claims and the world upon which they are held to bear. If the ER project is
to go through, then it needs to be shown that a 'commonsense realism' is compatible
with as sophisticated account of the language-world relation as we could reasonably
require.
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CHAPTER THREE: LANGUAGE AND REALITY
The final question I wiII address in this Research Report is whether or not
Epistemological Realism can give the right kind of account of the relationship
between language and reality. In particular, IwiII be concerned with examining the
extent to which ER can avoid what Putnam refers to as the 'metaphysical fantasy'
entailed by the TR account of how our empirical knowledge claims bear on reality. I
will argue in this regard that while ER will of necessity share some kind of common
ground with the TR picture of the language-world relation, it is nevertheless able to
avoid what is problematic about the TR conception. Indeed, it will be my central
contention that ER is in principle able to provide as sophisticated an account of the
language-world relation as we could reasonably require. It should be noted from the
outset however that the defense of a detailed account ofthe relationship between
language and the world is beyond the scope of this Research Report. My concern here
is to show (in a programmatic way) that ER is ABLE to advance an unproblematic
account of the language-world relationship, rather than to outlir e fully developed
theories of reference, meaning, truth and the like.
[AJ TRADITIONAL REALISM
In his 1994 Dewey lectures Putnam characterizes the TR conception of the language-
world relation as emerging from the following three claims:
(1) The world consists of a determinate totality of mind-independent objects
and properties, fixed in advance of human experience, and fixed rigidly.
(2) The words in language stand in a one-one correspondence relation to
these objects and properties, this relation grounding reference, meaning
and truth. TJ\ ..t. regard to truth it is held that a structural isomorphism
holds between true propositions in language and facts in the world.
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(3) Given that knowledge claims are claims about the distribution of
properties OVerobjects (and logical functions of such claims), it follows
in light of (1) and (2) that there is a definite totality of all possible
knowledge claims, likewise fixed in advance, and fixed independently of
the language user or thinker. There is exactly one true and complete
description of the world.
On the TR account then, the relationship between language and the world is held to
be a very neat and tidy affair. The world consists of a determinate number of mind-
independent objects and properties, to which the words in our language stand in a
one-one correspondence relation. The object or property to which any such word
refers determines the meaning of the word. Our empirical knowledge claims are
simply claims about the distribution of properties over objects, and so it follows that
there is some set or totality of all possible knowledge claims, which is fixed in
advance of human experience and cognition. [ As Putnam puts it, on the TR account
both the form of all our knowledge claims, and the way in which they are responsible
to reality, are 'fixed once and for all in advance' (1994, p449).
The picture of the language-world relation which arises from TR commitments (1)-
(3) is one inwhich language is viewed as nothing more than some sort of mirror-
image of the world. The metaphor of language as mirror image here is appropriate on
two counts. The first is that, on the TR view, language is held to 'mirror' the world
quite literally - a structural isomorphism is posited to hold between (true)
propositions in language and states of affairs in the world. (I will return to this idea in
more detail iater.) The second is that, according to TR, the world rigidly dictates both
the totality and the form of our possible descriptions of it - the nature of the word-
world correspondence relation ensures that our descriptions of the world can never
IOf course, as Putnam points out, the Traditional Realist is perfectly free to accept that the nature of
the language users or thinkers will determine which ofthe possible knowledge claims they are able to
think or verbalize. The point is simply that on the TR account the language users or thinkers play no
role in determining what the possible knowledge claims are.
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amount to anything over and above what Putnam terms 'a mere copying' of it (1994,
p452).
The TR account of the relationship between language and the world has been (rightly)
subject to a wide range of criticism, an appreciation of which has done much to
trigger the familiar 'recoil' to various forms of anti-realism. And indeed, it seems
evident in this post-Wittgensteinian era that if realism is to remain even so much as
an option for us it cannot involve anything very much like the TR conception of the
language-world relation at all. Before moving on to consider the resources avsilable
to ER in avoiding what Putnam terms the 'metaphysical fantasy' ofTR, it is necessary
to get a clearer sense of exactly what is wrong with the picture emerging from TR
commitments (1)-(3).
[B] THE METAPHYSICAL FANTASY
Although many philosophers Lave criticized the TR account of the language-world
relation, I will be almost exclusively concerned ill this section with the arguments of
Hilary Putnam. There are a number of reasons for focussing on Putnam in this regard,
perhaps the most important being that while Putnam is one of the few contemporary
philosophers concerned with developing a tenable realist position, none is as fully
appreciative as he of the shortcomings of the Traditional Realist picture. Indeed. it
was an acute awareness of the problems confronting the TR conception of the
relationship between language and the world that led the earlier Putnam to embrace
anti-realism.
Let us turn then to consider Putnam's arguments against the TR account of language
and its relation to reality. In his 199~ Dewey Lectures Putnam takes issue with the TR
account of the language-world relation in its entirety, claiming that the TR
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commitments (1)-(3) amount to nothing more than a 'metaphysical fantasy'? It is
Putnam's claim that when we reflect seriously on human experience, it becomes very
evident that the idea that the world dictates the totality of our possible descriptions of
it is radically misguided. Language does not stand to the world in the neat relation of
a mirror-image - our language is continuously developing, and with it the ways in
which it can be responsible to reality.
Putnam directs his first line of attack at the core of the TR conception of the
relationship between language and the world: the idea that our words stand in a one~
one correspondence relation to objects in the world, the latter giving the meaning of
the former. As was mentioned in Section [AJ above, if knowledge claims are taken to
be claims about the dish :u'ltion of properties over objl;;..;ts,then it is a commitment to
this kind of correspondence relation that is directly responsible for the picture in
which the world fixes the totality of our possible descriptions 'in advance'.
The point to see, Putnam argues, is that this account of reference and meaning is
hopelessly naive. On this view, the meanings of words are given by their worldly
referents, to which they stand in a one-one relation. In the case of a general name, the
word is held to refer to one KIND of object, and the meaning of the WOldis held to be
some property common to all the objects denoted by the word. As the later
Wittgenstein points out however, we cannot take this idea very seriously when we
reflect on our actual linguistic p.actices. For, in the first place, when we do tum our
attention to these practices, it becomes evident that the meanings of our words are
given less by their worldly referents than by their roles or uses in the various
language systems to which they belong. And in the second place, the nature of
reference itself is not one-one. Wittgenstein notes in this regard that there are many
2 It is worth pointing OL~tthat Putnam's arguments against tb\! 'fantasy' entailed by what he terms
'metaphysical realism' date back much earlier than tl.;s - the 'metaphysical realist' has been a
recurrent figure in Putnam's work for at least the last eighteen ars. (See Putnam, 1981, 1983, 1989
and 1990 in this regard.)
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words that we use perfectly well in spite of the fact that the things to which they refer
have no single property in common.'
In order to illrstrate how these Wittgensteinian considerations cut against the very
heart of the TR conception of the language-world relation, Putnam turns his attention
to the term 'object'. The Traditional Realist makes the 'comfortable assumption' that it
is so much as intelligible to speak of a fixed totality of 'objects' that our propositions
can be about. As Putnam points out however, even the wor.' 'object' does not
correspond to anyone kind of thing. There is no one set of identity conditions for
'object-hood' - our understandings Of what being an object amount to are multiple and
strongly context dependent. Putnam gives the example of a lamp with a loose shade
which falls off whenever the lamp is moved - does the lamp count as one object or
two? On the old criterion that a single object is one whose parts lTIOVewith the object
when it is moved, it seems that the lamp will not count as a single object. But we can
imagine many situations in which this criterion is inappropriate. If we were to point
to the lamp, a chair and a book, and ask of a young child 'How many objects are
there?', the desired result would be for the child to answer 'Three'. In this case we DO
C011ntthe lamp as a single object. Again, we can think of a physicist who would count
(he Jamp as a system of billions of objects. And the list goes on.
It emerges very strongly from the above that the TR conception of language as a mere
'mirror-image' of the world is extremely inaccurate. As Putnam writes, "description' is
never a mere copying ... we constantly add to the ways in which language can be
responsible to reality' 0994, p452). With regard to the lamp considered above, we
can describe it as a single object, or as a composite of two objects, or as a system of
billions of objects. (This of course is directly related to the fact that there is no neat
one-one correspondence relation grounding reference and meaning, contra the
, Wittgenstein used the (by now well-known) example of the word 'game' to illustrate this point. (Sep
his Philosophicallnvestig~tions in this regard.)
70
Traditional Realist.) There is simply no sense to the idea that the world fixes the
totality of our possible descriptions of it 'in advance',"
[C] DE-MYSTIFYING REALISM
I am in firm agreement with Putnam that ifER is to emerge as a tenable position then
it must full; accommodate the points made in Section [B] above. The ER theorist
must have no part in the 'metaphysical fantasy' entailed by TR commitments (1)-(3).
In particular, the image of language as a 'mirror-image' of the world must be rejected
- ER must acknowledge the sense in which, as Putnam puts it, 'we continuously
renegotiate ... our notion of reality as our language and life develops' (1994, p452).
It is important to say something in defense of this proposal however. The reason for
this is that itmight seem (at first glance at any rate) that the kinds of iusights into the
language-world relation outlined in Section [B] are not compatible with realism.
Indeed, many have argued - the earlier Putnam is himself one such example - that the
insights under consideration push very strongly in the direction of anti-realism.
To see what is at issue here, let us return to Putnam's example of the lamp. Suppose
the lamp is placed on a table. According to Putnam, it can be true to say that there is
one object on the table, and that there are two objects on the table, and that there are
billions of objects on the table. There is no sense to the TR claim that there is some
fixed totality of 'objects' that our propositions can be about. This has suggested to
many that whatever there is on the table is in an important sense 'up to us' - the world
is to an indeterminate extent the product of our own minds.
4 Putnam'S point here becomes even more evident when we imagine what the QUANTUM physicist
would have to say about the example of the lamp. And indeed, Putnam himself cites Quantum
Mechanics as,
... a wonderful example of how with the development of knowledge our idea of what counts
as even a POSSIBLE knowledge claim, our idea of what counts as even a POSSIBLE object,
and our idea of what counts as even a POSSIBLE property are all subject to change.
(1994, p452)
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Crucially, the move to idealism is completely unwarranted here. however. What the
example of the lamp serves to illustrate is that the word 'object' does not correspond
to anyone kind of thing ~we can use the word, and so describe the world, in a variety
of different ways. This point alone cannot carry any implications about the mind-
dependence (or indeed, independence) of the world. The ER theorist is perfectly free
to acknowledge the point that HOW WE CHOOSE TO DESCRIBE what is on the
table is 'up to us', without thereby being committed to the further claim that WHAT
IS ON THE TABLE is 'up to us'.
The anti-realist argument under consideration trades on an ambiguity in the use of the
word 'object'. We can use the term 'object' to speak about the concept itself, or we can
use it to speak about the worldly things that fall under it. The anti-realist takes
Putnam to be using the term in the second way, when he is in fact using it in the first.
What Putnam says of our concept 'object', the anti-realist takes him to be saying of
worldly objects themselves.
It is worth pointing out here that Putnam (unintentionally) invites this sort of anti-
realist response through not always being sufficiently clear about how he is using the
term 'object'. Indeed, it seems that Putnam is not concerned to draw the 'object'-object
distinction in this way at all, tacitly preferring to treat the term 'object' as a purely
grammatical notion.' Because this use of 'object' tends to push in the direction of anti-
realism. I will not follow Putnam in this regard. In my terms, Putnam's point can be
put as follows: the mind-independent objects of which the world is comprised do not
rigidly dictate or determine how we can think about them. The meaning of the term
'object' is not given by some property instantiated by all these worldly things.
(Indeed, the term 'object' does not have just one meaning - what being an object
amounts to will vary in accordance with which aspect of mind-independent reality we
are attempting to describe, and our interests in so describing it.) It should be noted
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however that departing from Putnam's account in this way obviously commits me to
some version of the TR commitment (1).6
Ev=n if tl e anti-realist acknowledges that the considerations raised in [B] do not
entail full-blown idealism, it might still be argued that they tell against the ER project
in another way. According to this line of the ught it is argued that while the example
of the lamp does not show that the mind-independent world does not exist, it does
show that our knowledge claims are not responsible to it. If the choice of how we
describe the world is 'up to us', then what sense is left to the idea that our descriptions
are nevertheless 'responsible to reality'?
The point to see here however is that in claiming up until now that the choice of how
to describe the world is 'up to us', we have been speaking loosely. What such talk was
designed to capture is the sense in which our empirical concepts (and so our empirical
descriptions) are continuously changing and developing - they are not fixed once and
for all by the world. < .at needs to be emphasized however is that the freedom
implicit in our concept 'mation carries with it a certain rational responsibility. As
Putnam notes, in the pui ~.t of empirical knowledge we have a 'cognitive
responsibility to do justice to whatever we describe' (i994, p452). It follows from this
that not all possible systems of describing the world will be equally good - indeed
some may well be entirely unacceptable.
[D] TRUTH
Before we can rest the case for Epistemological Realism there is one final issue that
remains to be addressed. One of the grounds upon which the TR conception of the
language-world relation has been most criticized concerns its theory of truth. Indeed,
5 This was pointed out to me by Michael Pendlebury.
6 If the notion of 'object' appealed to in (I) is not grammatical, then (1) is not a problematic claim,
however - it amounts to no more than a commitment to the mind-independence of the world. (This
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dissatisfaction with the TR conception of truth alone has led many philosophers to
embrace anti-realism." The question with which I will be concerned in this section
then is the extent to which ER can avoid what is problematic about the TR theory of
truth.
(i) The Correspondence Theory of Truth
TR advances wl..- .~commonly referred to as the Correspondence Theory of Truth.
On the Correspe, .nce Theory, a proposition is true just in case there is a fact in the
world to which it 'corresponds', To attribute the property 'truth' to some proposition is
to attribute to it the property of corresponding to some fact. The proposition THAT
THERE IS A CAT BEFORE ME has the property 'truth' if there is in actual fact a cat
before me. That there is a cat before me is the fact that corresponds to the proposition
TRA T THERE IS A CAT BEFORE ME and so makes it true. As Fred Sommers
notes in 'Putnam's Bom-Again Realism' (Sommers, 1997), on the Correspondence
Theory, 'any claim of the form 'it is true that p' is understood as the claim that 'p'
corresponds to - is made true by - some feature of reality.' (1997, p457).
From the way it has been characterized above it seems that far from being
problematic, the Correspondence Theory is perfectly tailored to meet the
requirements of realism. In order to secure the possibility of empirical knowledge, the
realist of any stripe - including the ER theorist - must maintain that it is the world that
determines the truth or falsity of our claims about it. If it is held that the world does
not occupy the role of 'truth-maker' in this regard, then it becomes difficult to see how
our claims could be accurately described as being ABOUT the world. If it is not the
mind-independent world that determines the truth or falsity of our empirical
knowledge claims, then it is not this world upon which our knowledge claims bear.
said, the ER theorist has no reason to hold that the objects comprising the mind-independent world
constitute a 'fixed totality', whatever this might mean.)
7 Michael Dummett and the early Putnam are the two most obvious examples here. I will say
something about their arguments in this regard in part (iii) of this section.
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And indeed, I do not think that there is anything wrong with the Correspondence
Theory as it has been outlined so far. I think that ER is at its most plausible when it
holds that what makes our propositions true is that facts stand in some sort of truth-
making relation to them." The problem with the Correspondence Theory lies in its
conception of what such 'truth-making' must amount to. To say simply of
propositions that they 'correspond' to facts is not in and of itself problematic. It is the
TR CHARACTERISATION of this correspondence relation that causes the trouble.
The question which must be addressed then is whether ER is able to offer an account
of how the truth of our propositions can be a mater of their standing in the right kind
of relation to the facts, without subscribing to the highly problematic TR
correspondence relation.
So for example the early Wittgenstein in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
(Wittgenstein, 1961) argues that our everyday propositions are analyzable into atomic
As was mentioned briefly in Section [A] above, the Traditional Realist cashes out the
truth-making correspondence relation in terms of a supposed structural isomorphism
posited to hold between true propositions in language and facts in the world. On the
TR view, true proposi.ions and facts stand to one another in a one-one relation - this
is a direct result of the TR commitment to the lower level one-one correspondence of
words to objects criticized in Section [B]. As William P. Alston points out in11
Realist Conception of Truth (Alston, 1996), the TR theorist needs to be able to
explicate this correspondence relation such that it is one particular fact - and not one
of the innumerable others which obtain - that stands in the relation of truth-maker to
some proposition. This has traditionally been done in terms of what Alston calls a
'structural 'matching' or 'fitting' of the two' (1996, p32).
8 It is important to note that it is no way evident that ER is INCOMPATIBLE with other ways of
thinking about truth. Indeed, in his 1994 Dewey Lectures Putnam argues that a strongly deflatlonist
account of truth in no way undermines the ER project. I am not concerned to take issue with Putnam in
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propositions, these latter consisting of simple names in a particular arrangement.
Such atomic propositions are held to bear something analogous to a 'pictorial
representation' to fac.; "atomic states of affairs in logical space.' Atomic states of
affairs consist of'partic.dar configurations of objects, the names in atomic
propositions standing in a one-one relation of reference to these objects. A particular
atomic proposition represents an atomic state of affairs just in case there is both a
name-object match and an arrangement-configuration match. A proposition is true if
the atomic propositions into which it is analyzable represent actual states of affairs in
the world.
That the TR correspondence relation posited to hold between true propositions and
facts is highly unsatisfactory should be obvious in light of the considerations raised in
Section [B]. For in the first place, the Traditional Realist's characterization ofthe
correspondence between true propositions and facts as a one-one relation will be no
less problematic than her c ption of the word-object relation as one-one. (As has
been mentioned, the form .mception is a direct consequence of the latter.) And in
the second place, the TR correspondence relation held to ground truth is even more
metaphysically suspect than that held to ground reference and meaning. Here
language is held to LITERALLY stand in the relation of a mirror-image to the world.
And this is surely nothing but bail ..·~taphysics. I will discuss each of these objections
in tum.
The first problem with the TR characterization of the truth-making correspondence
relation then is that it entails that propositions stand in a one-one relation to the facts
that make them true. to As Pendlebury points out in 'Facts as Truthmakers'
(Pendlebury, 1986), this seems plainly false however. With regard to the TR idea that
the fact-proposition truth-making relation must be one-one Pendlebury writes,
this regard - if Putnam is right then so much the better for ER. It does seem to me that ER should take
as few risks with its realism as possible however, given the current anti-realist climate.
9 Wittgenstein cefines 'logical space' as the totality of possible and actual states of affairs.
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...for those of us who do not regard facts as artifacts of thought and
language,' J this is surely, on reflection, incredible. I find it far more plausible
to assume that a relatively simple thought or sentence may be made true by a
relatively complex set of facts, and vice versa. The set off acts that makes it
true ·'Jat Smith is a bachelor is clearly far more complex than the thought that
he is. On the other hand, an enormously complex disjunction may be made
true by a very simple fact. The 1~1 theory cannot account for such intuitions.
(1986, pI77)
And indeed, from what was said in Section [B] it seems that Pendlebury is exactly
right here. Consider again Putnam's example of the lamp: it is the same fact that
makes the three propositions - that there is one object on the table, that there are two
objects on the table and that there are billions of objects on the table - true.
It 1S important to note that the (early) Wittgensteinian idea that while this one-one
correspondence does not hold between our ordinary propositions and our everyday
conception of facts, it nevertheless does hold between the atomic propositions into which
the fermer are analyzable and the atomic states of affairs of which the latter are constituted,
is of no help here. Wittgenstein's failure to provide even one such analysis of an ordinary
proposition into a set of atomic ones mitigates heavily against the existence of these latter
entities.
If the DR theorist is to advance that what makes our true propositions true is that they
stand in the right kind of relation to the facts then, she will have to depart from the
Traditional Realist's characterization of this relation as one-one. Importantly, there is
nothing standing in the way of her doing so. For unlike the Traditional Realist, the
10 As Austin writes of the TR correspondence theory, 'for every statement there exists 'one' and its
own precisely corresponding fact- for every cap the head it fits' (Austin, 1961, p91).
11 It is worth pointing out here that many have thought that facts MUST be linguistic entities, and have
consequently argued that the realist understanding of the fact-proposition truth-making relation is
incoherent. I will turn to consider this idea in part (ii) of this section. For now however I will contlnue
to characterize facts as non-linguistic states of affairs in the world.
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ER theorist is not committed to the lower level one-one correspondence of words to
objects.
The second problem with the TR truth-making correspondence relation with which I
am concerned here is that it is cashed out in terms of a 'structural match' posited to
hold between propositions and the facts that make them true. 12 On the TR account, a
proposition and a fact are held to correspond to one another just in case they are
structurally isomorphic. As Austin points out in 'Truth' however, when we tum our
attention to our actual use oflanguage it becomes extremely difficult to take this idea
seriously (Austin, 1961). As Austin writes,
We are absolutely free to appoint .A::·~Ysymbol to describe ANY type of
situation as far as merely being true goes. Ina small one-spade language (the
statement that) nuts might be true in exactly the same circumstances as the
statement in English that the National Liberals are the people's choice. There
is no need whatsoever for the words used in making a true statement to
'mirror' in any way, however indirect, any feature whatsoever of the situation
or event; a statement no more needs, in order to be true, to reproduce the
'multiplicity', say, or the 'structure' or 'form' of the reality, than a word needs
to be echoic Orwriting pictographic.
(1961, pp92-93)
I am in finn agreement with Austin in this regard. It seems plainly obvious that the
'fittit g' of some proposition to some or other (set of) fact(s) is a matter of our
linguistic conventions, and nothing more. IfER is to involve a commitment to the
idea that facts stand in a truth-making relation to propositions, then this relation will
have to be explicated as a purely conventional one.
12 Of course, once it is granted that the fact-proposition truth-making relation is not one ..one, then it
follows that this relation can no longer he explicated in terms of structural isomorphism. If a number of
distinct propositions can be made true by the same fact, then this cannot be a matter of such
propositions 'mirroring' the structure ofthat fact - the propositions are distinct from one another.
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Austin's own account of truth, despite its obvious limitations, provides a convenient
example of what is being suggested hr,re.12 Austin argues that in order to give a
satisfactory account of the fact-proposition truth-making relation we need to appeal to
two different sets of conventions:
DESCRIPTIVE conventions correlating the words (sentences) with the
TYPES of situation, thing, event etc., to be found in the world.
DEMONSTRATIVE conventions correlating the words (statements) with the
HISTORIC situations etc., to be found in the world.
Austin claims that git en the above we can say that a statement is true when 'the
historic state of affairs to which it is correlated by the demonstrative conventions (the
one to which it 'refers') is of a type 'with which (or, is sufficiently like those standard
states of affairs with which) the sentence used inmaking it is correlated by the
descriptive conventions' (1961, p90).14 The crucial point about Austin's
characterization of the fact-proposition truth-making relation is that it is purely a
matter of convention. It is we who decide that a certain set of words will represent or
refer to a certain aspect of the world.
It is worth pointing out that at least part of the reason for the Traditional Realist's
appealing to structural isomorphism in explicating the fact-proposition
correspondence relation is her commitment to the Indirect Theory of Perception. To
recall, it is a consequence "Ifthe Indirect Theory that we are never in direct perceptual
contact with the world itself. This can make it difficult to see how a determinate
13 Importantly, in appealing to Austin's account here I am in no way endorsing it as the more particular
account of truth that the ER theorist should advance. My purpose here is simply to show that it is
possible in principle to construe the fact-proposition truth-making relation as a ( mventional, as
opposed to a metaphysically suspect, matter. As has been mentioned, my conce • in this chapter is not
to advance a detailed account of the language-world relation, but rather to show that a commitment to
'commonsense realism' is compatible with as sophisticated an understanding of this relation as we
could reasonably require.
14 As should be evident from what Austin says here, he views statements and not propositions as the
rightful bearers of truth-value. While I am not concerned to defend it here, I prefer the more popular
account that truth-value attaches to the propositions EXPRESSED by statements. On this account, the
statement, 'There is a cat before me' expresses the proposition TH \ THERE IS A CA r BEFORE
ME, and it is this proposition to which truth-value attaches. See Alston (1996) and Sommers (1997) for
a more detailed exposition of this idea.
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relation between language and the world - between propositions and facts - could
ever come to be set up. Putnam in his anti-realist days expresses this worry as
follows:
The mind never compares an image or word with an object, but only with
other images, words, beliefs, judgements etc. The idea of a comparison of
words or mental representations with objects is a senseless one. So how can a
determinate correspondence between words or mental representations and
external objects ever be singled out? How is the reference supposed to be
fixed?
(1983, pix)
'Structural isomorphism' is the TR answer to Putnam's question, with regard to the
fact-proposition relation at any rate.
Once the Indirect Theory of Perception is rejected in favor of the Direct Theory
defended in Chapter Two however, the worry expressed by the early Putnam cannot
Lake hold. Once it is made intelligible th ,Iehave direct perceptual access to the
facts themselves, there can be no problem concerning our ability to refer to them in
the ways that we do simply because we choose to.
(ii) A word about facts
It has bee \ suggested above that the ER theorist retain a commitment to the TR idea
that our propositions are made true by standing in the right kind of relation to the
facts, while taking issue with the TR characterization of this relation. Many have
argued however that facts are simply not the kinds of things CAPABLE of standing
in this relation, on the ground that they are not constituents of mind-independent
reality. The idea here as Sommers puts it, is t.hat 'while things like cats and mats are
out there, a fact like the cat being on a mat is not' (Sommers, 1997, p459).15
15 It is important to note that Sommers in no way supports this idea. Indeed, his concern is rather with
developing an unproblematic account of how facts could be aspects of mind-independent reality.
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Why has the ontological status offacts become a contentious issue? After all, the idea
that the world is comprised of facts is an intuitively compelling one. It seems as
intelligible to admit states of affairs into our ontological account of the world as it
does objects and properties. As a number of philosophers committed to the idea ofa
fact-proposition truth-making relation have pointed out, at least a part of the answer
to this question is that the term 'fact' is an ambiguous one. 16 In particular, we do not
only use the. term 'fact' to refer to worldly states of affairs - very often we mean by a
'fact' a true proposition itself. With regard to this latter use of 'fact' Austin writes,
'We note that when a detective says 'Lets look at the facts' he does not crawl around
on the carpet, but proceeds to utter a string of statements: we even talk of 'stating the
facts" (1961, p91). In light of this latter use of the term 'fact', it can come to seem
that facts are not aspects of the independent world at all, but linguistic entities
themselves in need of some account of truth.
The problem with this line of thought is that it overlooks the former (and equally
legitimate) use of the expression 'fact'. Very often we DO use the expression to refer
to worldly states of affairs themselves, In 'Putnam's Born-Again Realism', Sommers
suggests that it is because of overlooking this former use of the expression 'fact' that
certain philosophers have fallen under the sway of the so-called 'same words'
argument (Sommers, 1997, p462). The argument runs as follows: For ally given
proposition we can only say what fact corresponds to it (if it is true) by using the
same words as we do in expressing the proposition itself. To return to the example
given in Part (i) of this section, if we are asked what fact stands in the relation of
truth-maker to the proposition THAT THERE IS A CAT BEFORE ME, we seem
compelled to give the answer: the fact that there is a cat before me. Therefore, the fact
that there is a cat before me cannot be distinct from the true proposition that there is a
cat before me - the idea of a two-place relation holding between the two is
unintelligible.
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Sommers points out quite correctly, however, that simply because we use the same
words in describing the fact that makes some proposition true as we do in expressing
that proposition itself does not mean that the fact and the proposition cannot be
distinct from one another. As was emphasized in the last section, that we use the
words we do to refer to things is a purely conventional matter, and can carry no
implications whatsoever for WHAT is thereby referred to. As Sommers writes, 'That
'the words themselves' jus+ used in speaking of the FACT (true proposition) are also
conventionally used in referring to the fact (state of affairs in the world) is no reason
to impugn their correspondence' (Sommers, 1997, p462).17 It is Sommers contention
that it is only if we have already embraced the equation of 'fact' with 'true
proposition' as a result of the ambiguity attaching to the former expression that we
will find the 'same words' argument compelling.
(iii) The Verificationist Challeng"
There is a potential objection to the kind of account of truth being advanced here that
must be considered. It is a widely accepted idea that sentence-meaning is analyzable
in terms of truth conditions - the meaning of any sentence is (at least partly) a matter
of the conditi ons under which it is true. If this account of sentence-meaning is correct
however, then it can seem to pose problems for the idea that the truth of our
propositions is a matter of their standing in the right kind of relation to the facts. 18
Michael Dummett points out that on the sort of account advanced here, truth is in
principle beyond our epistemic access (Dummett, 1959). It is a consequence of this
account that in order to ascertain whether or not some proposition is true we must
16 Austin (1961) and Sommers (1997) are two examples here.
17 Sommers draws the distinction between FACT (true proposition) and fact (worldly site of affairs)
in order to avoid the ambiguity attaching to our use of the term 'fact' discussed above.
18 I will use 'sentence' and 'proposition' interchangeably for the purposes of this discussion, since
nothing of relevance turns on my doing so. On the view I favor, a statement - which expresses a
proposition - just is a sentence in use.
82
establish whether or not some or other fact obtains. And the point to see is that we do
not have access to all possible facts. It is Dummer's perfectly correct point that if it is
held that what makes propositions true is that they stand in the right kind of relation
to the faces, then in many instances the truth of our propositions will be verification-
transcendent. Obvious examples here would include propositions about the distant
past and future.
Dumrnet argues that if the idea that sentence-meaning is analyzable in terms of truth-
conditions is correct however, truth cannot be a verification-transcendent property.
For if the meaning of (certain) of our sentences is to be analyzed in terms of
something to which we have no access, then we will not be able to give an account of
how we could have come to understand the sentence - to Grasp its meaning - i', the
first place. A.."1dthe point here is that such an account is required, unless we are
prepared to accept the plainly false idea that we do not understand the meaning of
e.g., propositions about the distant past and future.
As Alston points out, it is this objection to the idea of a fact-proposition truth-making
relation that forms a large part of the motivation behind what we can follow Alston h
calling 'the epistemic conception of truth' (Alston, 1996) On the epistemic
conception, the truth of any given proposition is held to consist in some or other kind
of 'positive epistemic status' of the proposition. Thus in Realisn With a Human Face
(Putnam, 1990), the earlier Putnam advances the view that we understand by truth
'idealized rational acceptability' - for a proposition to be true is for it to be
'warrantable on the basis of experience and intelligence for creatures with 'a rational
and sensible nature'. In a similar vein Dummett argues that a proposition is true if we
are able to recognize the (set of) fact(s) as obtaining that we have been taught justify
us in asserting the statement. Dummett suggests that:
...we no longer explain the sense of a statement by stipulating its truth values
in terms of the truth of its constituents, but by stipulating when it may be
83
asserted in terms of the conditions under which its constituents may be
asserted.
(1959, p161).
As Alston points out, the essential idea behind epistemic conceptions of truth is that
'the truth of a truth-bearer (a proposition) ... consists in the epistemic values (it)
displays WITHIN our thought, experience and discourse' (1996, p 189).
What then is the Epistemological Realist to say in response to the objection raised by
Dummett? To embrace an epistemic conception of truth is not open to the ER theorist
since that is the route to anti-realism - as has already been mentioned, the realist
cannot afford to give up the idea that it is the world which deter. nines the truth or
falsity of what we say about it. But as long as ER involves a commitment to the idea
that our propositions are rendered true by standing in the right kind of relation to the
facts, it seems that truth will remain verification-transcendent with regard to many of
our propositions. Is the only option available to ER then to reject the idea that
sentence-meaning is to be analyzed in terms of truth conditions?
Importantly, the answer here is no. In 'Defending Commonsense Realism'
Pendlebury outlines a way in which the ER theorist can retain a commitment to the
idea of a fact-proposition truth-making relation while doing justice to the insights
made by Dummett (Pendlebury, 1998b). The first point to note is that the truth of a
great number of our sentences on the ER account will not be verification-
transcendent. (Pendlebury refers to these as 'core sentences'.) The second is that the
constituents and structures of these sentences occur in and are intimately related to
those sentences whose truth IS verification-transcendent. (Pendlebury refers to these
latter as 'non-core' sentences.) Now it is evident that according to Dummett there can
be no problem with how we could come to grasp the meaning of the group of core
sentences. Put then in light of what has been said above it will also be possible to
give an account of how we could come to grasp the meaning ofthe non-core
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sentences. As Pendlebury argues, there are two things to which we can appeal in
explaining how a speaker could come to understand the group of non-core sentences:
(i) the speaker's presumed grasp of the meanings of the constituents and
structures of those sentences which also occur in core sentences, and
(ii) the speaker's grasp of the other relevant connections between the
constituents and structures of the non-core sentences and those which occur in core
Sl -ntences.
Pendlebury gives the following example. Consider a sentence the truth of which is
very clearly verification transcendent (from our perspective now at any rate) on the
ER account: 'There will be a large Eucalyptus tree on this spot at the start of the 25th
century' . As Pendlebury points out, we seem to have no problem in understanding
this sentence. The question is how the ER theorist can account for this fact given a
commitment to the idea that sentence-meaning is a matter of truth conditions.
Pendlebury's suggestion here is that t .e appeal to how the constituents and structure
of this sentence occur in, or are suitably connected with, the core sentences that are
not verification transcendent. Pendk' ury gives the example in this regard of the core
sentence: 'The tree in front of that orange house is a Eucalyptus'. And of course there
will be many others.
Dummett's 'verificationist challenge' turns out not to pose any difficulty for the
proposed ER account of truth then. That the truth of certain of our propositions is not
verification transcendent is sufficient to ensure that we can give an account of how
we could have come to understand the propositions whose truth value it ' ; beyond our
ability to ascertain.
I we .ild thus conclude that the Epistemological Realist can give a satisfactory account
of the relationship between language and the world. In the first place, ER is able to
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acknowledge the fact that language does not stand in anything like the relation of a
'miror-image' to the world. And in the second place, ER is able to give a plausible
account of truth where TR fails. To be sure, ER does have something in common
with the TR picture arising from commitments (1)-(3) -like the Traditional Realist,
the Epistemological Realist is committed to the idea that the world upon which our
language bears is the real, mind-independent one. Where ER departs from TR is in
the avoidance of any 'metaphysical fantasy'.
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CONCLUSION
My aim in this Research Report has been to show that the Epistemological Realist
project recently initiated by John McDowell and Hilary Putnam is a highly promising
one. Against a predominantly anti-realist philosophical climate the project aims to
secure a 'commonsense realism' about the world and our relationship to it,without
taking this realism for granted. In particular, the project fully acknowledges that if
realism is to be taken seriously again, there is much work to be done - not only in
developing new theories in a range of areas, but also through clarifying what a
commitment to realism does and does not entail. My concern here has been to
indicate that this two-fold strategy of development and clarification is able to achieve
the end of reinstating 'commonsense realism' as a philosophically respectable
position.
'Commonsense realism' is a holistic view involving a combination of ontological and
epistemological commitments. Simply stated, it involves a commitment to the
commonsense picture that we can (and do) have knowledge of the mind-independent
world, the possibility of such knowledge being in some sense secured by the access
we have to the world in perception. That this commonsense view of the world has lost
credibility is largely due to the widespread misconception that it cannot be
unproblematically developed. The prevalence of this misconception is in part due to
the fact that realism has not traditionally been satisfactorily developed in a number of
areas, and in part due to misguided assumptions of what the realist must be
committed to. As both Putnam and McDowell acknowledge, securing the aim of the
ER project is a matter of showing that 'Traditional Realism' is not the only realism
on offer.
In this Research Report I have concentrated on what I take to be the three major
failings of the Traditional Realist position: its account of how perception enables
empirical knowledge, its account of perception itself and its account of the
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relationship between our empirical knowledge claims and the mind-independent
world upon which they bear. I have attempted to show that in every case the
Epistemological Realist can depart from the problematic TR conception and develop
'commonsense realism' in a perfectly satisfactory way.
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